NONSENSE AND THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH:
WHAT MEANING MEANS FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Joseph Blocher*
ABSTRACT
A great deal of everyday expression is, strictly speaking, nonsense. But
courts and scholars have done little to consider whether or why such
meaningless speech, like nonrepresentational art, falls within “the freedom
of speech.” If, as many suggest, meaning is what separates speech from
sound and expression from conduct, then the constitutional case for
nonsense is complicated. And because nonsense is so common, the case is
also important—artists like Lewis Carroll and Jackson Pollock are not the
only putative “speakers” who should be concerned about the outcome.
This Article is the first to explore thoroughly the relationship between
nonsense and the freedom of speech; in doing so, it suggests ways to
determine what “meaning” means for First Amendment purposes. The
Article begins by demonstrating the scope and constitutional salience of
meaningless speech, showing that nonsense is multifarious, widespread, and
sometimes intertwined with traditional First Amendment values like
autonomy, the marketplace of ideas, and democracy. The second part of the
Article argues that exploring nonsense can illuminate the meaning of
meaning itself. This, too, is an important task, for although free speech
discourse often relies on the concept of meaning to chart the Amendment’s
scope, courts and scholars have done relatively little to establish what it
entails. Analytic philosophers, meanwhile, have spent the past century
doing little else. Their efforts—echoes of which can already be heard in
First Amendment doctrine—suggest that free speech doctrine is best served
by finding meaning in the way words are used, rather than in their
relationship to extra-linguistic concepts.
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INTRODUCTION
Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose approach to meaning and language
changed the course of modern philosophy,1 once wrote: “Don’t, for heavens
sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must pay attention to your
nonsense.”2 His exhortation is especially salient for those interested in the
scope of the First Amendment, because courts and scholars have often
suggested that the Amendment’s terrain is defined by meaning,3 without
doing much to show what meaning (or its absence, nonsense) actually
means. As a result, the concept of meaning operates like a rogue boundary
surveyor, erratically charting the First Amendment’s territory without
judicial or scholarly accountability.
This raises a variety of interesting and difficult questions. If meaning
establishes the boundaries of the First Amendment, then what are we to
make of nonsense—“words or language having no meaning or conveying
no intelligible ideas”4? If the Supreme Court is right that the Amendment’s
“constitutional safeguard . . . ‘was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people,’”5 then speech lacking such ideas—assuming that it
1

See Dennis M. Patterson, Law’s Pragmatism: Law As Practice & Narrative, 76 VA.
L. REV. 937, 938 (1990) (hereinafter Law’s Pragmatism) (“It is the thought of Ludwig
Wittgenstein which is central to modern philosophy’s turn to language. For Wittgenstein,
all philosophical problems are ultimately problems of language.”).
2
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, CULTURE AND VALUE 56 (1980); see also WITTGENSTEIN
AND HIS INTERPRETERS 32 n.22 (Guy Kahan et al. eds., 2007) (“Saul Liberman . . .
reportedly once introduced a 1940s lecture by the famous Kabbalah scholar Gershom
Scholem with the words ‘Nonsense is nonsense—but the history of nonsense is
scholarship.’” (internal citations omitted)).
3
See, e.g., John Greenman, On Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1347 (2008)
(“Frequently, behavior is said to be covered by the First Amendment if it conveys ‘ideas’
or ‘information.’”); Melville Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech under the First
Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 61 (1973) [hereinafter Nimmer, Symbolic Speech]
(“The crucial question under the first amendment is simply whether meaningful symbols of
any type are being employed by one who wishes to communicate to others.”); Peter Meijes
Tiersma, Nonverbal Communication and the Freedom of “Speech”, 1993 WISC. L. REV.
1525, 1559 (“[T]he first requirement for communication by conduct is that the conduct be
meaningful, most often as a matter of convention. This is simply an extension of a basic
principle of language: a speaker normally cannot use sounds to communicate unless the
sounds have some meaning attached to them.”).
4
Nonsense Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/nonsense (last visited July 4, 2012). See also William Charlton,
Nonsense, 17(4) BRITISH J. OF AESTHETICS 346, 346 (1977) (“The notion of nonsense has
been freely used by philosophers of this century, but no full or satisfactory account has
been given of it. … The English word ‘nonsense’ seems to apply most appropriately to
something which purports to have a sense of meaning, but does not in fact have one.”)
5
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (citing Roth v. United States,
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is actually “speech”6—would not seem to merit constitutional coverage at
all.7 That would be a jarring conclusion indeed, which might explain why
even those who treat meaning as an essential ingredient of speech tend to
avoid or assume it away. This is perhaps most noticeable in the context of
nonrepresentational art such as Jackson Pollock’s drip paintings and Lewis
Carroll’s nonsense verse. The Supreme Court has reassuringly declared
these to be “unquestionably shielded” by the First Amendment.8 But far
from being unquestionable, their shielding in fact raises questions that are,
as Mark Tushnet generously puts it, “quite difficult to answer
satisfactorily.”9
Part I of this Article demonstrates that the difficulty of these questions is
not the only cause for concern, and that artists—though they seem to have a
special relationship with nonsense10—are not the only would-be speakers
who should be keenly interested in the answer. A large portion of everyday
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)) (emphasis added); see also Mosley v. Police Dep’t, 408 U.S. 92,
95–96 (1972) (“[O]ur people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from
government censorship.” (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270) (citations omitted)).
6
Frederick Schauer, Categories and The First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34
VAND. L. REV. 265, 273 (1981) [hereinafter Schauer, Categories] (“[T]he constitutional
definition of the word ‘speech’ carves out a category that is not coextensive with the
ordinary language meaning of the word ‘speech.’”). I revisit this assumption below at notes
264-272 and accompanying text.
7
My goal is to investigate whether nonsense falls within the First Amendment—a
question of coverage—not to establish the level of protection it should receive. Frederick
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (2004) (“[Q]uestions about the
involvement of the First Amendment in the first instance are often far more consequential
than are the issues surrounding the strength of protection that the First Amendment affords
the speech to which it applies.”).
8
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
569 (1995) (“As some of these examples show, a narrow, succinctly articulable message is
not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a
‘particularized message’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of
Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”
(internal citation omitted)).
9
Mark Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 169, 170
(2012).
10
Id. at 169 (providing examples of artists denying the necessity of traditional
meaning in their work, including Archibald MacLeish’s claim that “[a] poem should not
mean but be,” “Ars Poetica” (1926), and William Carlos Williams’s refrain, “No ideas but
in things,” “A Sort of a Song”, in The Wedge (1944)). See also Amy M. Adler, Note, PostModern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359, 1364 (1990) (stating that
post-modern art “not only rejected the Modernist demand that art be ‘serious,’ it rejected
the idea that art must have any traditional ‘value’ at all.”); id. at 1367 (“[T]he 80’s has been
the decade in which art that denies the value of art has become the most valuable art
around.” (quoting Elizabeth Frank, Art’s Off-the-Wall Critic, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1989, §
6 (Magazine), at 78)).
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speech is, strictly speaking, nonsense.11 Sometimes we speak without
intending to “mean” anything at all—exclamations, jokes, doggerel verse,
and even philosophical illustrations may all be nonsensical.12 As
Wittgenstein himself wrote in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: “My
propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally
recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on
them, over them.”13 Other times, we are unaware of our own nonsense,
either because we wrongly believe our propositions to be meaningful or
because we are simply misunderstood.14 If meaning is a prerequisite for
constitutional coverage, and much of what we say is meaningless without
our ever knowing it, then the boundaries of the First Amendment are not
only narrow but unknown.
Simply to describe the broad scope of nonsense both demonstrates its
importance and suggests that meaning is at best an unreliable guide to the
First Amendment’s hinterlands.15 Moreover, its guidance would not
necessarily be welcome even if it were accurate, because much nonsensical
speech rests solidly on the normative foundations of the First
Amendment—the values that doctrine is created to protect.16 Primary
11

See generally Section I.A.
See infra Section I.A.1. (discussing covert nonsense). See also Charlton, supra note
4, at 346 (“It would normally be thought fairly damning to say of an utterance or a piece of
writing ‘That is nonsense.’ Yet men of undoubted intelligence, like Edward Lear and Lewis
Carroll, have devoted time and pains to writing what they admit is nonsense, and talking
nonsense has been regarded as a conversational art.”).
13
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS § 6.54 (C.K. Ogden
trans) [hereinafter WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS]. Whether this is really what he intended
(and whether he succeeded) is of course another matter. The “meaning” of the Tractatus’
avowed lack of sense has been an elusive and perhaps ephemeral grail for analytic
philosophers. See generally infra notes 93-108 (describing debate over “ineffable” and
“resolute” readings); see also Leo K.C. Cheung, The Disenchantments of Nonsense:
Understanding Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 31(3) PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 197, 201–
03 (July 2008).
14
See infra Section I.A.2. (discussing covert nonsense).
15
I follow Robert Post’s lead by attempting to tell a story in which doctrine and
normative commitments are mutually interdependent. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY,
EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM (2012) [hereinafter POST, DEMOCRACY] (“To
determine the purposes of the First Amendment, therefore, we must consult the actual
shape of entrenched First Amendment jurisprudence.”); Robert Post, Participatory
Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 617, 618 (2011)
(“Because law typically acquires authority from the commitments and principles of those
whom it seeks to govern, I have sought to identify this fundamental purpose by inquiring
into our historical commitments and principles.”) (citing Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel,
Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the
Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1473, 1474 (2007)).
16
See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Transmitting, Editing, and Communicating:
Determining What “The Freedom of Speech” Encompasses, 60 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1676
12
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among these are the marketplace of ideas, individual autonomy, and
democratic participation. Nonsense can and often does further each of
them.17
Part I thus sketches the terrain of nonsensical speech, and makes a
preliminary case for its protection. In doing so, it uncovers a uniquely
convenient entrance to the very depths of the First Amendment, shining
light on the idea of meaning itself. Spelunking in this area is difficult and
hazardous business, and Part II proceeds with caution. But the exploration is
increasingly unavoidable, for First Amendment theory and doctrine often
suggest that meaning is an essential part of constitutionally salient speech
without defining what meaning is or where it comes from. In other words,
courts and free speech scholars have not explained what meaning means.
Analytic philosophers, meanwhile, have been doing little else.18
Throughout the past century (paralleling almost exactly the lifespan of the
modern First Amendment)19 they have developed two primary methods for
charting the boundaries of what can meaningfully be said. Of course, their
goal in doing so has been to find the limits of language, thought, and the
world,20 not to generate constitutional doctrine. And yet the tools they have
created—which with egregious but necessary oversimplification can be
called conceptual meaning and use meaning—have been wielded,
sometimes awkwardly and perhaps unknowingly, by the Justices
themselves.
The “conceptual” approach finds meaning in the relationship between
expression and underlying concepts.21 Some version of this basic idea
(2011) (“The answer to the question of what constitutes the freedom of speech depends on
the conception one adopts, and one’s choice of conception is more analogous to a purely
subjective preference than to a conclusion reached by a series of falsifiable steps.”).
17
Infra Section I.B. See also Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to
Freedom of Speech, 671 UCLA L. REV. 671, 722 (1983) (“Expression that is not intended
to communicate anything may clearly promote the four values identified by Emerson as
underlying the first amendment.”). Emerson’s fourth value focuses on “whether, although
the conduct may not in itself qualify for protection, such protection is necessary to
safeguard other, qualified conduct.” Id. at 722. I discuss this argument below at notes 154159 and accompanying text.
18
See B.R. Tilghman, Literature, Philosophy, and Nonsense, 30(3) BRITISH J. OF
AESTHETICS 256, 256 (July 1990) (“[A] good case can be made that the notion of meaning
and all it implies for the distinction between sense and nonsense has been the primary
concern of twentieth-century philosophy, at least Anglo-American philosophy.”).
19
Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV.
1256, 1278 n.97 (2005) (suggesting that the popular, albeit “crude,” view is that “the First
Amendment started in 1919” when Justice Holmes wrote his dissent in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)).
20
WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 13, § 5.6 (“The limits of my language mean
the limits of my world.”).
21
See infra II.A. The label itself is a necessary but regrettable simplification. See infra
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underlies the logical-positivist approach associated with Bertrand Russell
and the early Wittgenstein, among many others. As Russell once put it,
“[a]bsorption in language sometimes leads to a neglect of the connexion of
language with non-linguistic facts, although it is this connexion that gives
meaning to words and significance to sentences.”22 Under the conceptual
approach, speech that fails to represent extra-linguistic ideas is simply
nonsense and, if meaning is an essential ingredient of constitutionally
salient speech, therefore falls outside the realm of the First Amendment.
A conceptual approach to meaning apparently animates many of the
Supreme Court’s efforts to chart the boundaries of the freedom of speech,
from the oft-repeated aphorism that “[t]he First Amendment . . . embodies
our profound national commitment to the free exchange of ideas”23 to the
Spence test, which asks whether “an intent to convey a particularized
message was present, and whether the likelihood was great that the message
would be understood by those who viewed it.”24 The conceptual approach is
also implicitly employed by those who fret about the constitutional
protection of nonrepresentational art.25 Nonrepresentationalism, after all, is
only problematic for the First Amendment if representativeness itself is
constitutionally relevant.
Despite its intuitive appeal, the conceptual approach is defective as a
constitutional principle. Requiring speech acts to represent ideas would
exclude nearly all of the potentially valuable nonsense described in Part I.
Indeed, the conceptual approach would effectively deny constitutional
coverage to vast stretches of discourse, including ethics, aesthetics, and
religion, all of which—according to the conceptualist philosophers—lie
beyond language’s power to represent. On the conceptual account, they
simply “cannot be expressed,”26 and thus “the tendency of all men who ever
tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of
language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely
hopeless.”27 Fortunately, the First Amendment is not so limited; the
note 164.
22
HERBERT HOCHBERG, INTRODUCING ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, Preface (2003).
23
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (internal citation omitted). See also
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973) (“All ideas having even the slightest
redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to
the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of the [First Amendment’s]
guarantees.”) (internal citation omitted).
24
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974).
25
See, e.g., Nimmer, Symbolic Speech, supra note 3, at 35 (“It would be shocking to
conclude that symphonic compositions or nonrepresentational art could be the subject of
governmental censorship. Both are fully within the ambit of the first amendment
notwithstanding their lack of both verbal and cognitive content.”).
26
WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 13, § 6.421.
27
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, THE WITTGENSTEIN READER 296 (Anthony Kenny ed.,
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boundaries of the freedom of speech are not coextensive with the “walls of
our cage.”
In part to escape that cage, analytic philosophy long ago took what is
known as the linguistic turn.28 That development, which is closely
associated with Wittgenstein’s later work, speech act theory, and ordinary
language philosophy, generally holds that “[t]he bounds of sense, as it were,
are all within language, and meaning is nowhere other than in the many
activities in which human beings use their various languages.”29 As
Wittgenstein explained, “[f]or a large class of cases—though not for all—in
which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of
a word is its use in the language.”30 Finding the boundaries of meaning,
then, depends on identifying the “language games” that “consist[] of
language and the actions into which it is woven.”31
Echoes of a use meaning approach can already be found in First
Amendment discourse and doctrine. It explains the Court’s conclusion that
constitutional coverage extends to practices that form a “significant medium
for the communication of ideas,”32 and is not “confined to expressions
conveying a ‘particularized message.’”33 One can also find the influence of
such an approach in First Amendment scholarship, perhaps most
prominently and thoughtfully in Robert Post’s argument that First
Amendment values “do not attach to abstract acts of communication as
such, but rather to the social contexts that envelop and give constitutional

1994) (quoted in James Boyle, Anachronism of the Moral Sentiments? Integrity,
Postmodernism, and Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 493, 519 (1999)).
28
Dennis Patterson, Wittgenstein and Constitutional Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1837,
1854–55 (1994) (“The legacy of philosophy from the middle of this century to the present
has been the systematic replacement of foundationalist epistemology with holism, the
substitution of referential theories of language with an emphasis on speech as action, and a
general movement away from the individual as the foundation of empirical, linguistic, and
moral judgment.”).
29
Dennis Patterson, Conscience and the Constitution, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 270, 303–04
(1993) (internal citation omitted); see also Owen M. Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 177, 177 (1985) (“Conventionalism is a viewpoint, most closely associated with the
later writings of Wittgenstein, that emphasizes practice and context. It holds, for example,
that we understand a concept not when we grasp some fact, but when we can successfully
use that concept within a language game or a defined context, and that truth is a function of
the agreement of those participating within a practice rather than the other way around.”)
(internal citation omitted).
30
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 43 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed 1958) [hereinafter WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS].
31
Id. at 7.
32
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
33
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 569 (1995) (internal citations omitted).
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significance to acts of communication.”34
The use meaning approach improves on the conceptual approach both
descriptively and normatively. It accounts for the constitutional value in
various forms of nonsense, captures the contextual and socially embedded
nature of language, and provides better answers to thorny problems like the
constitutional status of art. Under the use meaning approach,
“Jabberwocky” is protected by the First Amendment not because its words
represent concepts, but because it is recognizable as a poem. By contrast,
those acts and utterances that violate the rules of our “language games”
simply do not count as meaningful speech, even if they represent facts or
concepts and would therefore be meaningful under the conceptual
approach.35
The Article thus concludes by endorsing the First Amendment’s
linguistic turn and its effort to find meaning in use, rather than in the
relationship of language to concepts. Making the most of such an approach,
however, is no simple task.36 As Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson put it,
language games “refuse clear-cut boundaries, they borrow and steal from
other sources, they overlap with other language games, and their governing
rules are always in a state of flux and disputation. Lived language games are
unruly and unkempt, untamed and untidy, much as life itself is.”37 But if the
First Amendment’s boundaries depend on them, then such games must be
tamed. Doctrine must provide guidance; it must be able to identify the First
Amendment language games that create the kind of meaning the
constitution requires. The use meaning approach does not provide easy
answers to these problems, but it does provide a better set of questions with
which to address them.
I. STUFF AND NONSENSE
Making sense of nonsense for First Amendment purposes involves at
34

Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1255
(1995) [hereinafter Post, Recuperating]; see also id. at 1276–77 (“Instead of aspiring to
articulate abstract characteristics of speech, doctrine out to identify discrete forms of social
order that are imbued with constitutional value, and it ought to clarify and safeguard the
ways in which speech facilitates that constitutional value.”). My goal here is, in part, to
show that one potential “abstract characteristic[] of speech”—meaning—is in fact derived
from “discrete forms of social order.”
35
Cf. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 771-75
(2001) (considering the First Amendment claims of a person who protests speed limits by
violating them).
36
See infra Section III.C.
37
Jack Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1771,
1802 (1994) [hereinafter Balkin & Levinson, Grammar]; see also WITTGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 30, at 65.
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least two tasks: establishing what nonsense is, and determining whether it
has constitutional value.38 This Part attempts to accomplish both, first
sketching the landscape of meaningless speech and then showing how that
nonsense relates to the basic values traditionally associated with the First
Amendment. The discussion therefore not only describes the scope and
value of nonsense, but also delivers a preliminary case for its constitutional
protection and opens the door for Part II’s exploration of the concept of
meaning itself.
Because the goal is to have constitutional reasoning drive conceptual
analysis rather than the other way around, the discussion here evaluates the
scope and constitutional value of nonsense in somewhat general terms—as
the absence of meaning39—before elaborating a more rigorous definition of
meaning in Part II. The downside of this approach is that it is, as an initial
matter, over-expansive: Jackson Pollock’s work, for example, lacks a
certain kind of meaning (propositional content), and therefore qualifies as a
certain kind of nonsense, despite its undoubted value and First Amendment
protection. Indeed, that is precisely the point of the following discussion—
to develop an appropriate definition of meaning based on an understanding
of what it would exclude. And at least as an initial matter, it is not enough
to simply posit that meaning is not to be equated with propositional content,
for much First Amendment scholarship and doctrine makes precisely that
connection.40
Section I.A begins by describing nonsense’s broad domain.
Traditionally, it has been thought that boundary disputes between meaning
and nonsense are only really relevant to the First Amendment in the context
of art, and that a capacious view of that category can more or less solve the
problem. But nonsense contains multitudes, and not all of its forms are
easily recognizable as such. The very scope of nonsense demonstrates the
importance of explaining it, and also suggests that unless the First
Amendment has been radically misunderstood, the constitution covers at
least some of this meaningless speech.
As a matter of doctrine, however, it is not particularly satisfying to say
that nonsense must be protected by the constitution because there is so
much of it. In order to merit coverage, nonsense must presumably further
the values traditionally associated with the First Amendment,41 such as
38

One might also ask whether nonsense can be “speech,” but I will assume an
affirmative answer for now and return to that issue below. See infra 268-272 and
accompanying text.
39
See supra note 4 and sources cited therein.
40
See infra notes 160-162 and 195-206 and accompanying text.
41
POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 15, at 4 (“The actual contours of First Amendment
doctrine cannot be explained merely by facts in the world; they must instead reflect the
law’s efforts to achieve constitutional values.”).
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autonomy, the marketplace of ideas, and democracy. Section I.B argues that
nonsense does exactly that, advancing the autonomous search for unsayable
truths, contributing to cognitive advancement despite lacking “meaning” of
its own, and even providing valuable outlets for political dissent. It follows
that the First Amendment must make room for nonsense, as Part II argues in
more detail.
A. The Scope of Nonsense
Whatever else it suggests, Wittgenstein’s admonition to “pay attention
to your nonsense” was at the very least a call to recognize nonsense where it
arises. As this Section shows, that is a difficult but rewarding task, for
nonsense takes many forms.42 In an effort to impose some order, the
following discussion divides nonsense—“[w]ords or signs having no
intelligible meaning”43—into two major categories: overt and covert.44
1. Overt Nonsense
At almost the same time as Russell and Wittgenstein were busy in
Cambridge trying to pin down nonsense, Lewis Carroll was busy in Oxford
releasing more of it. “Jabberwocky,” perhaps his most famous piece of
nonsense verse (and a cameo performer in First Amendment doctrine),45
42

Charlton, supra note 4, at 346 (“In general philosophers have gone wrong in
supposing that whatever is nonsensical is nonsensical in the same way.”).
43
“Nonsense,” The Free Dictionary, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/nonsense (last
visited July 11, 2012); see also “Nonsense,” The Oxford Dictionary,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/nonsense (last visited July 11, 2012)
(“spoken or written words that have no meaning or make no sense”).
44
It would be perfectly plausible to slice nonsense in other ways, however—between
purposeful and accidental, substantial and mere, illuminating and misleading, and so on.
Oskari Kuusela, Nonsense and Clarification in the Tractatus—Resolute and Ineffability
Readings and the Tractatus’ Failure, in WITTGENSTEIN AND THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY:
ACTA PHILOSOPHICA FENNICA, 35, 37 (Sami Pihlström ed., 2006), available at
http://philosophy.uchicago.edu/faculty/files/conant/Readings%20of%
20TLP%20and%20its%20failure[1].pdf (distinguishing “between misleading and
illuminating nonsense. The former is unself-conscious nonsense attempting to say what can
only be shown. The latter is self-conscious nonsense intended to reveal its own
nonsensicalness.”).
The two approaches to meaning discussed in Part II also suggest their own definitions
of nonsense; indeed, the Article concludes by arguing that “conceptual” nonsense is
constitutionally protected, while “use” nonsense is not. Because that argument is dependent
in part on the fact that the former would include—and therefore exclude from constitutional
coverage—so much everyday nonsense, it is better to start with a more general definition
of nonsense.
45
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
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begins: “’Twas brillig, and the slithy toves / Did gyre and gimble in the
wabe; / All mimsy were the borogroves, / and the mome raths outgrabe.”46
As far as the reader can tell,47 these are symbols with no references; “sound
and fury, signifying nothing.”48 As such, they are overt nonsense.49
Neither the speaker nor the hearer of overt nonsense believes it to have
meaning. Its lack of meaning is thus both intentional and apparent.50 Some
overt nonsense is fanciful, in that it does not purport to convey meaning, but
rather is designed to create a sense of amusement or delight in the listener.
People seem to enjoy such nonsense for the same reasons that babies gurgle
at novel stimuli—it provides a sense of wonder, possibility, and absurdity.
But overt nonsense need not have such an ulterior purpose; it can simply be
nonsense for nonsense’s sake.51
Much artistic expression is overtly and sometimes avowedly
nonsensical. In his thoughtful analysis of nonrepresentational art, Mark
Tushnet points out that many artists—from Archibald MacLeish to William
Carlos Williams—have denied the need for, or desirability of, a direct
connection between art and traditional meaning.52 As Williams put it, “A
poem should not mean but be.”53 In a recent essay, Charles Rosen makes a
similar point:
We should recall here the extraordinary sixteenth-century
557, 569 (1995). The Jabberwocky is perhaps the most famous of Carroll’s nonsense, but it
is by no means the only example. See, e.g., LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND
(1865) (“Never imagine yourself not to be otherwise than what it might appear to others
that what you were or might have been was not otherwise than what you would have
appeared to be otherwise.”).
46
LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE
12 (1872).
47
Carroll and Humpty Dumpty—his avatar of nonsense—later provided a glossary of
terms, but the poem itself nonetheless operates like a nonsensical “private language.” See
infra 234-235 and accompanying text (discussing Humpty Dumpty’s private language).
48
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, act 5, sc. 5.
49
See Kuusela, supra note 44, at 37 (describing Peter Hacker’s view of overt
nonsense). Cf. P.M.S. HACKER, INSIGHT AND ILLUSION: THEMES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
WITTGENSTEIN 18–19 (1987) [hereinafter HACKER, INSIGHT AND ILLUSION](distinguishing
overt and covert nonsense).
50
Charlton refers to something like this when he discusses “factual” nonsense: “An
utterance is factual nonsense if a person uttering it cannot mean what he says without
ignoring plain facts, or what are taken to be plain facts.” Charlton, supra note 4, at 352
(distinguishing factual from “grammatical” and “logical” nonsense).
51
Id. at 355 (“A man could not, of course, compose what he knows is nonsense
without having a purpose of some sort. But he need have no ulterior purpose, no reason for
writing what he writes except that it is nonsense. Lear and Carroll, at least, seem to have
written nonsense for its own sake in this way.”).
52
Tushnet, supra note 9, at 169.
53
Id. (quoting William Carlos Williams, “A Sort of a Song,” in THE WEDGE (1944)).
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controversy about style between the admirers of Cicero and
Erasmus, the former, led by Etienne Dolet, believing that
style had a beauty independent of the matter of the literary
work, and the latter insisting that the beauty of style was
wholly dependent on its consonance of meaning.54
Of course, one need not look that far (nor that high) to find examples of art
that overtly lacks conceptual meaning. Consider the lyrics of popular songs,
from “I Am the Walrus”55 to “Who Put the Bomp”56 to those consisting
entirely of gibberish.57
The relationship between overt nonsense and art is not monogamous,
however. Philosophers and linguists frequently rely on overt nonsense as an
analytic instrument.58 The Tractatus, for example, openly proclaims itself to
lack meaning.59 A.W. Moore and Peter Sullivan explain that Wittgenstein
had no choice but to use nonsense to demonstrate the boundaries of
meaning itself: “The Tractatus consists mostly of nonsense because what
Wittgenstein is trying to convey, about language and its limits, is, by its
own lights, ineffable. The only way in which he can convey it—the only
54

Charles Rosen, Freedom and Art, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (May 10,
2012), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/may/10/freedom-andart.
55
THE BEATLES, I Am the Walrus, on MAGICAL MYSTERY TOUR (Capitol Records
1967) (“Semolina pilchards climbing up the Eiffel Tower / Elementary penguin singing
Hare Krishna / man you should have seen them / kicking Edgar Allen Poe”); see also THE
BEATLES, Come Together, on ABBEY ROAD Capitol Records 1969).
56
BARRY MILLS, WHO PUT THE BOMP (ABC-Paramount 1961) (“When my baby heard
/ ‘Bomp bah bah bomp’ / ‘Bah bomp bah bomp bah bomp bomp’ / Every word went right
into her heart.”)
57
ADRIANO CELENTANO, Prisencolinensinainciusol, on NOSTALROCK (Clan Celentano
1973) (consisting of “lyrics” that mimic what American English sounds like to an Italianspeaking listener).
58
Cf. Charlton, supra note 4, at 347 (“Unless they wish to illustrate a philosophic point
people seldom compose total nonsense on purpose.”).
59
WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 13, § 6.54 (“My propositions are
elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless . . .
.”). Wittgenstein’s use of the word “senseless” rather than “nonsense” is significant, for he
posited a difference between the two. For the purposes of the present discussion, however,
those weeds can hopefully be avoided, for both involve a lack of meaning. LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 2.2 (2010), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/Wittgenstein/ [hereinafter STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA]
(“The characteristic of being senseless applies not only to the propositions of logic but also
to other things that cannot be represented, such as mathematics or the pictorial form itself
of the pictures that do represent. These are, like tautologies and contradictions, literally
sense-less, they have no sense. Beyond, or aside from, senseless propositions Wittgenstein
identifies another group of statements which cannot carry sense: the nonsensical (unsinnig)
propositions. Nonsense, as opposed to senselessness, is encountered when a proposition is
even more radically devoid of meaning, when it transcends the bounds of sense.”).
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way in which he can get the reader to ‘see the world aright’—is by dint of a
special kind of nonsense: what we might call ‘illuminating’ nonsense.”60
Unsurprisingly, many linguists have taken a similar approach. In his
dissertation, for example, Noam Chomsky set out to demonstrate among
other things that a sentence can be grammatically correct and yet lack
semantic meaning. His famous example was the phrase “[c]olorless green
ideas sleep furiously.”61
2. Covert Nonsense
Whereas the meaninglessness of overt nonsense is self-conscious62 and
apparent to speaker and hearer alike, covert nonsense is potentially more
insidious. It arises where a speaker or hearer (or both) incorrectly believes
that they are successfully exchanging meaningful ideas.
Perhaps the most common type of covert nonsense is the
straightforward misunderstanding, in which speaker and hearer disagree
about the specific meaning of a particular speech act, or even whether the
purported speech act has meaning at all. This Section cannot and will not
attempt to fully address the relationship between misunderstandings and the
freedom of speech—an interesting issue in its own right—but rather tries to
identify the particular problems that misunderstandings pose for meaningdependent approaches to the First Amendment.
“Simple” misunderstandings occur when the speaker intends one
meaning and the listener hears another. Such situations are, of course,
extremely common, but—taken at face value—some approaches to the
definition of speech might exclude them.63 Carroll’s poetry and Pollock’s
60

A.W. Moore & Peter Sullivan, Ineffability and Nonsense, 77 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, SUPP. VOL. 169, 179 (2003). As Wittgenstein explained, the aim
of the Tractatus was to “draw a limit to thinking,” which “can . . . only be drawn in
language and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense.”
WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 13, at Preface.
61
NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES 15 (1957).
62
Kuusela, supra note 44, at 37.
63
See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (the Court “cannot
accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea”);
Nimmer, Symbolic Speech, supra note 3, at 37 (concluding that “symbolic speech requires
not merely that given conduct results in a meaning effect, but that the actor causing such
conduct must intend such a meaning effect by his conduct”).
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that these authorities would actually exclude
misunderstandings from the First Amendment, only that their approaches seem to do so, as
stated. Nimmer, for example, posited that a “meaning effect” was necessary for symbolic
speech, but also that the Amendment covered speech lacking “both verbal and cognitive
content.” Id.
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paintings are “unquestionably shielded” by the First Amendment,64 but one
might reasonably ask whether many people “understand” them. For that
matter, one could ask the same of Finnegan’s Wake, Matthew Barney’s
movies, or any number of other impenetrable artistic works. So, too, are few
listeners able to understand the specific meanings of most scientific,
scholarly, or even legal speech. And it would be troubling, to say the least,
if discussions of ERISA or the Higgs Boson—or professors’ efforts to teach
them—lack First Amendment protection simply because so few people
comprehend them at first.
But misunderstandings can be more complicated. In addition to
disagreeing about what meaning is conveyed by a purported speech act,
people sometimes disagree about whether the act is meaningful at all. Such
“deep” misunderstandings arise in at least two ways, which can with some
oversimplification be called “lost meaning” and “found meaning.” The
former occurs where a speaker intends to convey meaning and the listener
fails to recognize not only the specific meaning, but the nature of the act as
meaningful. In other words, the listener does not even perceive the
purported speech act as an effort to communicate meaning. Consider a
computer programmer who expresses herself in code.65 A non-programmer
might not only fail understand the code’s specific meaning, but that it
contains meaning at all.
Found meaning, by contrast, arises where a listener imputes meaning to
an act when the putative speaker never meant to convey any. First
Amendment theory and doctrine have not focused extensively on the
possibility of found meaning, but interesting hypotheticals easily come to
mind. Imagine, for example, that a person sees a famous pianist sitting on a
bench at her piano. The performer is simply taking a break, thinking about a
recent vacation. The starstruck and credulous viewer, however, imagines
that she is trying out a new performance of John Cage’s 4’33”, which
consists of four and a half minutes of silence.66 The viewer has discovered
meaning and imputed it to the daydreaming pianist, but no volitional speech
has occurred. One could even stipulate that the person on the bench is not a
pianist at all, but a janitor resting after her shift. Or imagine a traveler
strolling in a foreign country, singing the supposedly nonsensical words of
his favorite song. Little does he know that in the country he is visiting,
64

Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 569 (1995).
65
See Universal City Studios, Inc., v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“Communication does not lose constitutional protection as ‘speech’ simply because it is
expressed in the language of computer code. Mathematical formulae and musical scores are
written in ‘code,’ i.e., symbolic notations not comprehensible to the uninitiated, and yet
both are covered by the First Amendment.”).
66
JOHN CAGE, 4’33” (1952).
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“semolina pilchards” is a grievous and actionable insult. Is the janitor or the
tourist “speaking” for First Amendment purposes, notwithstanding the fact
that neither intends to communicate any meaning?
First Amendment theory and doctrine do not provide clear answers as to
whether such unintentional speech is constitutionally covered.67 On the one
hand, denying constitutional coverage to unintended speech could leave out
a wide range of speakers who cannot control their speech acts—those who
are under coercion or asleep, for example. A person with Tourette
Syndrome may have involuntary verbal tics that can include a wide variety
of “vocalizations,” from “grunting, throat clearing, shouting and barking” to
“socially inappropriate words and phrases.”68 If such a person were to
involuntarily utter an actionable threat or libel, shouldn’t she be able to raise
the First Amendment as a defense? On the one hand, Tushnet suggests that
a “‘reasonable’ imputation of meaning to otherwise meaningless words—or
symbols—is sufficient to trigger First Amendment coverage.”69 On the
other hand, treating involuntary acts as meaningful speech also suggests that
the people who “spoke” them can be held responsible for meaning they
never intended to convey. Transforming their nonsense into speech will not
always work to their advantage, as the student in Morse v. Frederick
learned.70
Finally, covert nonsense can arise where both speaker and hearer
incorrectly believe that they have communicated meaningful ideas. Even
though the parties think they are engaged in communication, their words
actually lack meaning.71 This sounds farfetched, but probably happens more
often that we would like to think. On some accounts, language is
meaningful only when it refers to some extra-linguistic fact,72 and a great
deal of everyday speech fails this test. Normative statements such as “you
67

In “Mental States and Constitutional Rights” (work in progress), I consider in some
detail whether constitutional rights have act and mental state requirements analogous to
those found in tort and criminal law.
68
What is Tourette Syndrome?, NAT’L TOURETTE SYNDROME ASS’N, http://www.tsausa.org/aMedical/whatists.html (last visited June 19, 2012).
69
Tushnet, supra note 9 at 198; see also id. at at 215 (“Taken together with Hurley and
Cohen, Humanitarian Law Project implies that any activity that enough people regard as
having some meaning, noncognitive as well as cognitive, must survive the highest level of
scrutiny . . . .”).
70
551 U.S. 393, 401–02 (2007) (upholding punishment of student who displayed
banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” notwithstanding student’s belief that the banner
was “nonsense meant to attract television cameras”).
71
Cf. Kuusela, supra note 44, at 37 (distinguishing “between misleading and
illuminating nonsense. The former is unself-conscious nonsense attempting to say what can
only be shown. The latter is self-conscious nonsense intended to reveal its own
nonsensicalness.”).
72
See infra Section II.A (describing conceptual approach).

26-Jan-13]

BLOCHER – SPEECH AND MEANING

17

should X,” for example, are effectively nonsensical under this approach,
except as corruptions of the statement “I want you to X.” Wittgenstein
himself believed, at least in his early phase, that aesthetics, ethics, and
theology “cannot be expressed,”73 and are therefore nonsensical. But of
course they are also enormously significant—many people regard such
matters as the very lifeblood of public discourse.
The very idea of covert nonsense is somewhat unsettling; its apparent
scope is downright disturbing. If much of what we say is nonsensical
without our even realizing it, then the boundaries of the First Amendment
are not only narrow but unknown. Any time we fail to give meaning to our
propositions, despite our best efforts and despite believing that we have
done so, we are operating outside of constitutional protections.
B. The Constitutional Value of Nonsense
Simply describing the broad scope of nonsense suggests that the
meaning-dependent approach provides a poor map of the First
Amendment’s actual boundaries, for much of the nonsensical speech
discussed in the previous Section is undoubtedly covered by the
constitution. But it is unsatisfying to say that nonsense should be protected
by the First Amendment simply because it is plentiful. Appealing as that
conclusion might be, it is normatively defensible only if nonsense serves
relevant constitutional values such as the marketplace of ideas, individual
autonomy, and democracy.74 The following discussion attempts to show
that nonsense is in fact an important means of furthering each of those
values.
1. The Marketplace of Ideas

73

WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 13, §§ 6.42, .421 (“Hence also there can be
no ethical propositions. . . . [E]thics cannot be expressed.”). See also WITTGENSTEIN,
TRACTATUS, supra note 13, § 4.003 (“[M]ost propositions and questions, that have been
written about philosophical matters, are not false, but senseless.”), Gregory S. Kavka,
Wittgensteinian Political Theory, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1455, 1458 n.7 (1974) (“Since . . .
Wittgenstein holds that propositions of ethics, aesthetics, and religion are not amenable to
such analysis, he concludes that such propositions lack cognitive significance. . . . This
does not mean that Wittgenstein regards the propositions of aesthetics, ethics, and religion
as worthless—such propositions are strictly speaking nonsensical, yet they possess a kind
of mystical significance for they try to express that which is important but linguistically
inexpressible.”).
74
I do not mean to suggest that these are the only free speech principles, nor that we
must choose only one of them. Post, Recuperating, supra note 34, at 1271 (“There is in fact
no general free speech principle . . . .”).
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The marketplace of ideas—the first75 and perhaps still most prominent76
effort to justify the freedom of speech—rests on the notion that, if left
unregulated, good ideas will eventually win out over bad ones. In American
law, the theory is traced to Justice Holmes’ argument that “the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the marketplace.”77 Importantly, the truths that the marketplace can
supposedly uncover are not narrowly defined, and can include political and
ethical insights as well as empirical facts.78 As Justice Brandeis put it in his
own statement of the marketplace rationale, “freedom to think as you will
and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth.”79
Inasmuch as nonsense represents a disconnect between words and
ideas,80 it seems out of place in a marketplace devoted to the latter,
particularly when ideas are valuable only as handmaidens to truth.81 This is
particularly so under some conceptions of “truth” itself. Just as some
75

Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence,
88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2356 (2000) [hereinafter Post, Reconciling].
76
See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 73 (1960) (arguing that
establishing truth through a marketplace of ideas “is not merely the ‘best’ test. There is no
other.”); see also William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First
Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“In Speech Clause jurisprudence, for
example, the oft-repeated metaphor that the First Amendment fosters a marketplace of
ideas that allows truth to ultimately prevail over falsity has been virtually canonized.”).
77
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also
JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING 45
(H.B. Cotterill ed., MacMillan & Co. 1959) (1644) (“Let her and Falsehood grapple; who
ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?”).
78
See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653, 2674 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“These test-related distinctions reflect the constitutional importance of maintaining a free
marketplace of ideas, a marketplace that provides access to ‘social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences.’” (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969)).
79
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
80
“Nonsense,” Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/nonsense (last visited July 4, 2012) (defining nonsense as “words or language
having no meaning or conveying no intelligible ideas”).
81
See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 205 (“What ‘idea’ does Jackson Pollock’s Blue Poles:
No.11 convey? Even more, what idea does Ulysses convey?”). Sheldon H. Nahmod,
Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful, the Sublime, and the First
Amendment, 1987 WISC. L. REV. 221, 231. (“The [marketplace] theory’s emphasis on
ideas, however, is troubling, and has the potential for making the first amendment value of
art derivative. To the extent that the concept of ideas refers to intellectual and cognitive
processes, it does not take account of the noncognitive and emotional aspects of
communication which often accompany artistic expression, especially of the
nonrepresentational kind.”). Cf. Brandt v. Bd. of Educ. Of City of Chicago, 480 F.3d 460,
465 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Self expression is not to be equated to the expression of ideas or
opinions and thus to participation in the intellectual marketplace.”).
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analytic approaches find meaning in the relationship between language and
extra-linguistic facts,82 the correspondence theory of truth holds that
statements are true when they represent “actual” extra-linguistic facts.83 As
Russell explained, “a belief is true when there is a corresponding fact, and is
false when there is no corresponding fact.”84 A statement that does not
correspond to a fact therefore seems meaningless under a formal approach
to meaning, and false under a correspondence theory of truth. If
meaningless statements do not even refer to extra-linguistic facts, how can
they possibly promote the intellectual search for those facts?
But such an argument unfairly oversimplifies both the normative vision
of the marketplace model and the potential cognitive value of nonsense. As
to the former, even the harshest critics of the marketplace model do not
envision it being animated solely by a correspondence theory of truth.
Under the marketplace approach, the value of free speech extends beyond
the accurate identification of facts. Instead, the vision seems to be of what is
called a “coherence” theory of truth, one that identifies as true that which
people, through open discussion, come to regard as such.85 The First
Amendment generally shies away from legally enforceable determinations
about what is “really” true, at least with regard to speech in public
discourse.86
Even if one thinks that the First Amendment is concerned only with the
conveyance of true facts, it is apparent that doctrine embodies a kind of
epistemological humility on the part of government.87 The reasons for this
82

See infra Section II.A.
See BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 84 (1912).
84
Id. at 85.
85
Paul G. Chevigny, Philosophy of Language and Free Expression, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV.
157, 167 (1980) (noting that, under the modern analytic approach, “there is no simple or
certain way to know the meanings of words and sentences; even their ‘truth’ depends on
the game in which they are used.”). There is of course a danger of tautology here, one that
reemerges in efforts to define as “speech” that which people recognize as such. Cf. Post,
Reconciling, supra note 75, at 2366 (“In the absence of such a morality [of public debate],
it is merely tautological to presume that truth is what most people come to believe after
open discussion.”).
86
See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (“The First Amendment
recognizes no such thing as a ‘false’ idea.” (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 339 (1974))). As Post notes, the Court has also said that “there is no constitutional
value in false statements of fact.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340; POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note
15, at 29–31, 43–47 (suggesting that the distinction can be explained based on whether the
purportedly false statements are part of public discourse). See also United States v.
Alvarez, --- S.Ct. ---- (June 28, 2012) (striking down Stolen Valor Act, which criminalized
lies about certain military medals).
87
Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic
Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CALIF. L.
REV. 267, 271 (1991).
83
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are easy enough to perceive, and they suggest that nonsense may be entitled
to protection under a marketplace theory. One such reason is a general
distrust for government officials determining the meaning of private
speech.88 And perhaps if the marketplace model requires judges to be
agnostic as to truthfulness, then they should also be agnostic as to
meaningfulness.
Some version of this concern has arisen in the context of art, with many
judges and scholars arguing that judges are not well-suited to determine
art’s meaning, value, or even existence. As Justice Holmes once put it,
judging the value of art is a “dangerous undertaking for persons trained only
in the law.”89 If we do not trust judges to identify which of many possible
meanings a work of art conveys, why would we trust them to identify
whether it conveys meaning at all? After all, imbuing meaning where none
is intended can distort speech just as much as other forms of
misunderstanding. Consider again Carroll’s verse. Some believe
“Jabberwocky” to be overtly nonsensical, as suggested above.90 Others
suggest to the contrary that the poem represents not nonsense, but a

88

Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1,
2 (1989) [hereinafter Schauer, Second-Best] (“Not only the first amendment, but also the
very idea of a principle of freedom of speech, is an embodiment of a risk-averse distrust of
decisionmakers.”); see generally Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First
Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985).
89
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903); see also Miller
v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1100 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring)
(“[A First Amendment claim regarding nude dancing] strikes judges as ridiculous in part
because we are either middle-aged or elderly men, in part because we tend to be snooty
about popular culture, in part because as public officials we have a natural tendency to
think political expression more important than artistic expression, in part because we are
Americans—which means that we have been raised in a culture in which puritanism,
philistinism, and promiscuity are complexly and often incongruously interwoven—and in
part because like all lawyers we are formalists who believe deep down that the speech in
statutes and the Constitution mean what they say, and a striptease is not speech.”), rev’d
sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
The question has also proven difficult for persons not “trained only in the law,” as
Jeremy Waldron points out: “What [art critics] find is that they cannot agree about the
definition of ‘art.’” Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some
Philosophical Issues, 82 CAL. L. REV. 509, 530–31 (1994).
90
Susan Stuart, Shibboleths and Ceballos: Eroding Constitutional Rights Through
Pseudocommunication, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1545, 1546 (“Jabberwocky has no meaning,
at least that an adult audience could discern.”). The word “Jabberwocky,” after all, is often
used as a synonym for mere nonsense. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of
Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1478 (2010) (“The artistic solution, in
effect, is the expression, or vehicle, for the themes, meaning, and emotion essential to the
found artistic problem. Without it, artistic expression becomes nothing more than
Jabberwocky.”).
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purposeful and illustrative distortion of sense.91 Who are judges to
determine which of these is the better interpretation of Carroll?
Nonsense—overt and otherwise—can also be a useful, perhaps even
essential, tool in illuminating certain kinds of truth.92 Consider again (and
again and again) the Tractatus. What is the truth value of a book that
proclaims itself to be nonsensical? That question has bedeviled and divided
philosophers for the better part of a century,93 and although no clear victor
has emerged, their efforts demonstrate that nonsense can play a unique and
important role in the intellectual marketplace.
The battle lines of the Tractarian debate are currently drawn between
what have been called the “ineffable” and “resolute” readings. The former,
represented prominently by Bertrand Russell, Peter Hacker, and others,94
holds that “there are, according to the author of the Tractatus, ineffable
truths that can be apprehended.”95 As Russell put it in his introduction to the
Tractatus, “after all, Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about
what cannot be said, thus suggesting to the skeptical reader that possibly
there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some
other exit.”96 And as Hacker points out, “that there are things that cannot be
put into words, but which make themselves manifest (Tractatus 6.522) is a
leitmotif running through the whole of the Tractatus.”97 According to the
91

Peter J. Lucas, Jabberwocky back to Old English: Nonsense, Anglo-Saxon and
Oxford, in LANGUAGE HISTORY AND LINGUISTIC MODELLING 503 (1997).
92
Kuusela, supra note 44, at 37.
93
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 59, § 2.4 (“‘Nonsense’ has become the hinge
of Wittgensteinian interpretative discussion during the last decade of the 20th century.
Beyond the bounds of language lies nonsense—propositions which cannot picture
anything—and Wittgenstein bans traditional metaphysics to that area. The quandary arises
concerning the question of what it is that inhabits that realm of nonsense since Wittgenstein
does seem to be saying that there is something there to be shown (rather than said) and
does, indeed, characterize it as the ‘mystical.’”).
94
See, e.g., G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, AN INTRODUCTION TO WITTGENSTEIN’S TRACTATUS
162 (1971); HACKER, INSIGHT AND ILLUSION, supra note 49; ANTHONY KENNY,
WITTGENSTEIN (2006); NORMAN MALCOLM, NOTHING IS HIDDEN, WITTGENSTEIN’S
CRITICISM OF HIS EARLY THOUGHT (1986).
95
Peter M.S. Hacker, Was He Trying to Whistle It?, in THE NEW WITTGENSTEIN 353,
368 (Alice Marguerite Crary & Rupert J. Read eds., 2000) [hereinafter Hacker, Trying to
Whistle It]. The reference in Hacker’s title is to a remark by Wittgenstein’s friend, the
Cambridge mathematician Frank Ramsey, who wrote that if Wittgenstein was right, then
“we must take seriously that [philosophy] is nonsense, and not pretend, as Wittgenstein
does, that it is an important nonsense.” FRANK RAMSEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
MATHEMATICS 263 (R.B. Braithwaite ed., 1931). Connecting the famous final line of the
Tractatus to Wittgenstein’s well-known habit, Ramsey wrote, “[b]ut what we can’t say, we
can’t say, and we can’t whistle it either.” Id. at 238.
96
WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 13, at xxviii (referencing § 7).
97
Hacker, Trying to Whistle It, supra note 95, at 353; see also Roy Brand, Making
Sense Speaking Nonsense, 35(3) PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM 311, 323 (2004) (“According to
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ineffable reading, Wittgenstein’s goal was to help us see these things
“aright,” and then to discard the apparatus that helped us to do so.98 The
book itself is overt nonsense (or at least aims to be, for those who
understand it), but with a purpose.
The resolute or “austere” reading, most closely associated with James
Conant and Cora Diamond,99 rejects the notion that there are unsayable
truths, or different kinds of nonsense.100 According to this reading, “it is a
mistake to think that there is anything informative about nonsense.
Nonsense is nonsense and to think of the Tractatus as showing some
essential feature of reality, which reality has all right, but which we cannot
say or think it has, is to make Wittgenstein chicken out.”101 The purpose of
the Tractatus is therefore therapeutic, rather than demonstrative.102 It seeks
to cure us of the pointless and potentially harmful effort of trying to find
meaning in nonsense.103 On this reading, “the whole talk of limits of
the ineffable reading, what cannot be said is not a position within language but some extralinguistic truths.”). The ineffable reading appears to be a matter of precedent in the Second
Circuit. Cf. Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The ideas and
concepts embodied in visual art have the power to transcend . . . language limitations and
reach beyond a particular language group to both the educated and the illiterate.”).
98
WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 13, § 6.54 (“My propositions are
elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when
he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the
ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)”).
99
See, e.g., James Conant, Two Conceptions of Die Überwindung der Metaphysik:
Carnap and Early Wittgenstein, in WITTGENSTEIN IN AMERICA 13 (T. McCarthy and S. C.
Stidd eds. 2001); James Conant, Elucidation and Nonsense in Frege and Early
Wittgenstein, in THE NEW WITTGENSTEIN 149 (A. Crary & R. Read eds. 2000); James
Conant, Must We Show What We Cannot Say?, in THE SENSES OF STANLEY CAVELL 242
(R. Fleming & M. Payne eds. 1989); Cora Diamond, Throwing Away the Ladder: How to
Read the Tractatus, in THE REALIST SPIRIT 179 (Cora Diamond, ed. 1991) [hereinafter
Diamond, Throwing Away the Ladder]; Cora Diamond, Logical Syntax in Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus, 55 PHIL. QUARTERLY 55 78 (2005).
100
Edmund Dain, Contextualism and Nonsense in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 25(2) S.
AFR. J. PHILOS. 91, 92 (2006) (“There are, for austerity, no logically distinct kinds of
nonsense; all nonsense, logically speaking, is on a par.”).
101
Brand, supra note 97, at 332 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It was
Diamond who first wrote that the ineffable interpretation of Wittgenstein read the
philosopher as “chickening out.” Diamond, Throwing Away the Ladder, supra note 99, at
181.
102
Marie McGinn, Between Metaphysics and Nonsense: Elucidation in Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus, 49 PHIL. QUARTERLY 491 (1999); see also Brand, supra note 97, at 326 (“The
say/show distinction is meant to liberate us from the mental torture of a mind obsessively
occupied with itself, chasing after itself in a movement that is increasingly vacuous,
isolated, and cold.”); Moore & Sullivan, supra note 60, at 179 (“There is nothing ineffable.
There is only the temptation to see sense where it is lacking. Wittgenstein’s aim is
therapeutic.”).
103
Cheung, supra note 13, at 200 (concluding that, according to Diamond and Conant,
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language is confused; there is nothing that language cannot say. Language
can represent every possible fact in the world and there are no other-worldly
facts.”104 After all, Wittgenstein himself said that “[t]he limits of my
language mean the limits of my world.”105 And although Russell’s
introduction to the book seems to support the ineffability reading,
Wittgenstein thought that Russell had not “got hold of my main
contention.”106
In an effort to avoid joining a debate it wishes merely to describe, this
brief description of the ineffable and resolute readings inevitably simplifies
and flattens them. Subtleties abound; variations are common.107 The goal
here is simply to suggest that nonsense can be cognitively illuminating—
meaningless speech, in other words, can have value as a means to truth. For
adherents to the ineffable view, nonsense can demonstrate the existence of
important put perhaps unsayable truths. Many artists describe their work as
an effort to do just that.108 And for adherents to the resolute view, nonsense
can be a tool to save us from useless and potentially misleading efforts to
establish meaning where none can be found. It is therapeutic—intellectually
and not just emotionally so.
But high-level epistemological debates are not the only contexts in
which nonsense can contribute to the marketplace of ideas. Much as

“the Tractatus is not trying to help anyone see any unsayable insights,” but that “the aim of
the Tractatus is merely to liberate nonsense utterers from nonsense, and that this is to be
achieved by the non-frame sentences serving as elucidations”). Conant, Elucidation and
Nonsense, supra note 99, at 196 (“[T]he aim for the Tractarian elucidation is to reveal
(through the employment of mere nonsense) that what appears to be substantial nonsense is
mere nonsense.”).
104
Brand, supra note 97, at 330.
105
WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 13, § 5.6.
106
As Wittgenstein wrote to Russell: “I’m afraid you haven’t got hold of my main
contention to which the whole business of logical propositions is only a corollary. The
main point is the theory of what can be expressed by a proposition—i.e., by language—
(and which comes to the same thing what can be thought) and what cannot be expressed by
proposition, but only shown; which I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy.”
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, LETTERS TO RUSSELL, KEYNES, AND MOORE 37 (G.H. von Wright
ed., 1974).
107
See, e.g., Brand, supra note 97, at 312 (defending an “existential-performative”
reading of Wittgenstein, which would hold that “[t]here is a showing that is not a saying
but what is shown is nothing beyond language; rather it is the very existence of language—
its ability to perform sense”); Cheung, supra note 13, at 199 n.13 (“The resolute reading
allows numerous variants,” which have been classified “into ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ versions
based on their different views of the nature of the frame.”).
108
Hegel, for one, believed that art was useful—albeit not as much as philosophy—as
a guide to truth. See Nahmod, supra note 81, at 232 (citing GEORG FRIEDRICH HEGEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF FINE ART 15–16 (Osmaston trans. 1920)).
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falsehood can demonstrate truth,109 nonsense can illuminate meaning by
demonstrating its boundaries. The Tractatus is not unique in that regard. It
has been said that Carroll created his nonsense verse “not to put anything in
doubt or to entertain any new conceptual possibilities, but to remind us
where sense is to be found.”110 So, too, can engaging with nonsense enable
individuals to better comprehend truth and meaning. This is certainly the
case with regard to art, which as discussed above is often overtly
nonsensical. Even where it lacks meaning, such art can, as the Supreme
Court has recognized, “affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of
ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the
subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression.”111 As
William Charlton puts it, “whereas we outgrow play with spoons and
handkerchiefs, our intellectual faculties will always benefit from the
quickening effect of good nonsense.”112
2. Autonomy
The most potentially expansive theory of the First Amendment is that
speech deserves constitutional protection because and to the degree that it
furthers individual autonomy.113 Martin Redish, perhaps the most prominent
defender of this view, has argued that “[a]ll forms of expression that further
the self-realization value, which justifies the democratic system as well as

109

See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964) (“Even a false
statement may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings
about ‘the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with
error.’” (quoting John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS 5, 20
(Stefan Collini ed. 1989))); Mill, supra, at 23 (concluding that silencing speech “rob[s] the
human race” because even when an opinion is false, its contrast with the truth will more
clearly illuminate the latter); Mark Spottswood, Falsity, Insincerity, and the Freedom of
Expression, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RIGHTS J. 1203, 1203 (2008) (“False statements often
have value in themselves, and we should protect them even in some situations where we
are not concerned with chilling truthful speech. . . . False speech, therefore, is valuable
because it is an essential part of a larger system that works to increase society’s
knowledge.”).
110
Tilghman, supra note 18, at 262
111
Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (referring to motion pictures); see
Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 77 (1996) (“Art can carry ideas and
information, but it also goes beyond logical, rational and discursive communication. It
provides a risk-free opportunity to live in other worlds, enlarging individual perspective
and strengthening individual judgment.”).
112
Charlton, supra note 4, at 360.
113
There are potentially important distinctions within what I have called the autonomy
view—some scholars trumpet the values of self-realization or self-fulfillment instead. For
simplicity’s sake, I have grouped them together here.
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free speech’s role in it, are deserving of full constitutional protection.”114 Ed
Baker similarly argued that speech “should receive constitutional protection
. . . because and to the extent that it is a manifestation of individual
autonomy.”115 The expansiveness of the autonomy conception leaves its
defenders with a vast territory to patrol, since nearly any act can be
described as a manifestation of individual autonomy.
The very breadth of the autonomy view comfortably encompasses many
forms of meaningless speech, for nonsense can surely manifest autonomy
whether or not it “develop[s] the rational faculties.”116 After all, much of
what we think and feel is impossible to express in words.117 This may be a
result of deficiencies in our shared language, our limited individual
vocabularies, or “practical, social, or psychological impediments to our
using even the linguistic resources available to us.”118 Whatever the reason
for these limits, or whether we recognize when they are transgressed, our
efforts to express what lies beyond them create a kind of nonsense—
statements that are unverifiable, fail to describe any possible states of
affairs, or attempt to say what can only be shown.119
And yet from the perspective of individual autonomy and selffulfillment, we may have very good reason not to pass over such things in
silence. Though arguably nonsensical, beyond those limits may lie our
chaotic, contradictory, and even “ineffable” selves.120 Efforts to represent
114

Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 594 (1982).
Tim Scanlon once defended a similar viewpoint, see e.g., Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of
Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972), but has since done his best to
repudiate it. T.M. Scanlon, Why Not Base Free Speech on Autonomy or Democracy?, 97
VA. L. REV. 541, 546 (2011) (“As someone who once made a mistaken appeal to autonomy
as the centerpiece of a theory of freedom of expression, my position in the Dantean Inferno
of free speech debates seems to be repeatedly assailed with misuses of this notion, no
matter how I criticize them.”).
115
C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 981
(1997); see also C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of
Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8 (1976) (arguing that the First Amendment protects
speaker’s self-realization).
116
Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 80
(1989) (“[E]xpression may promote human flourishing in ways other than developing the
rational faculties. Freedom of speech may allow the expression of powerful emotions and
provide an outlet for the creative impulse in a variety of forms, including literature, drama,
and the creative arts.”).
117
Moore & Sullivan, supra note 60, at 173 (“Most of us have at one time or another
found that we cannot express how we feel about something.”).
118
Id.
119
See infra Section II.A (describing conceptual approach, under which these would be
considered nonsensical).
120
Cf. Rosen, supra note 54 (“By the beginning of the twentieth century, when Hugo
von Hofmannstahl, in the ‘Chandos Letter,’ asserted the inadequacy to express anything
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them may lack meaning according to some definitions, but they are also a
very important part of individual and social human development.121 Even
Wittgenstein recognized that there was a kind of mystical value in some
kinds of nonsense.122
As a First Amendment matter, these issues—and the autonomy value of
nonsense—are most salient with regard to artistic speech, the constitutional
status of which has been a perennial problem for the First Amendment.123
Some courts and scholars simply take it for granted that the Amendment
must cover art, and do little to explain why.124 Perhaps equally common are
efforts to suggest that art does in fact have constitutionally salient meaning.
As Marci Hamilton notes, “[m]irroring the commentators’ approach, the
Court tends to protect art only to the extent that it is a vehicle for ideas,
especially political ideas.”125 For many works of art, this approach is
perfectly adequate,126 particularly given the extremely expansive definitions
of “meaning” that courts and scholars apply to art.127 But not all art can fit
profoundly individual and subjective, one of the first words to have completely lost its
meaning for him was ‘freedom.’”).
121
Hamilton, supra note 111, at 79 (“Self-preservation cannot be achieved merely by
following principles; it depends on the realization of human potentials, and these can only
be brought to light by literature, not by systematic discourse.” (quoting WOLFGANG ISER,
THE ACT OF READING: A THEORY OF AESTHETIC RESPONSE 76 (1978))).
122
See generally JAMES ROBERT ATKINSON, THE MYSTICAL IN WITTGENSTEIN’S
EARLY WRITINGS (2009).
123
Edward J. Eberle, Art as Speech, 11 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 3 (2007) (“The
Supreme Court has ruled that particular instances of art speech are protected expression,
but has not supplied a satisfactory rationale for protecting art. . . . Major First Amendment
theorists likewise have not devoted substantial attention to art speech.”).
124
Tushnet, supra note 9, at 170 n.4 (“Much of the secondary literature on art and the
First Amendment assumes art’s coverage and derives First Amendment rules to deal with
specific problems.”); see, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239,
251 (1903) (“A rule cannot be laid down that would excommunicate the paintings of
Degas.”); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602 (1998) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“It goes without saying that artistic expression lies within . . . First
Amendment protection.”).
125
Hamilton, supra note 111, at 105.
126
Id. at 108 (“Because a significant number of artworks can be construed to have
discursive content, existing theories of art’s first amendment content undeniably provide
protection to a degree.”); see COLIN MARTINDALE, THE CLOCKWORK MUSE: THE
PREDICTABILITY OF ARTISTIC CHANGE 42–43 (1990) (“[T]he more meaningful something
is, the better people like it. At least for artistically naïve observers, meaning is by far the
most important determinant of preference.” (cited in Fromer, supra note 90, at 1478 n.253).
127
See, e.g., Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 696 (“[P]aintings, photographs,
prints and sculptures . . . always communicate some idea or concept to those who view it,
and as such are entitled to full First Amendment protection.”); Eberle, supra note 123, at 7
(“[A]rt speech is the autonomous use of the artist’s creative process to make and fashion
form, color, symbol, image, movement or other communication of meaning that is made
manifest in a tangible medium.”).
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into the meaning-dependent model, no matter how far the concept of
meaning is stretched, which raises what Hamilton describes as “the
difficulty of explaining how a first amendment theory valuing speech for its
rationally comprehensible ideas can comfortably accommodate the
phenomenon of art.”128
Perhaps instead we should take seriously the notion that some art is
nonsensical.129 Indeed, if works of art contained articulable ideas, one
suspects that they would be said and not sung.130 Tushnet puts the point
powerfully, and with apt illustrations:
To begin, many modern sculptors would deny that they
“intend” to express anything in their work. Rather, they seek
to explore the relation between shape and space, nothing
more (or less). Nor . . . is the abjuration of any intent to
express limited to sculptors. . . . Art as form—being rather
than meaning—is not intended to communicate, even though
it may sometimes do so. A related point is that sometimes
artworks are engagements with a tradition. As such, it is not
clear that they “mean” anything.131
Rather than trying to impute meaning to such artistic speech, we could
instead ask whether nonsense for nonsense’s sake—like art for art’s
sake132—serves important First Amendment values.
Among those values, autonomy is the most natural candidate. Surely
one of the fundamental goals of artistic expression, after all, is to try to say
or represent the inexpressible.133 To do so is to speak nonsense, and yet no
one could doubt the importance of such nonsense to the autonomy and selfdevelopment of those speaking it.134 It can serve the autonomy interests of
viewers as well. Aesthetic judgments are part of the “pleasure of freedom
128

Hamilton, supra note 111, at 103–04.
See, e.g., HERBERT READ, ICON AND IDEA (1955) (arguing that art is not always the
product of cognitive activity and that the icon sometimes precedes the idea).
130
Hamilton, supra note 111, at 74 (quoting Isadora Duncan: “If I could say it, I
wouldn’t have to dance it.”).
131
Tushnet, supra note 9, at 188-189 (internal citations omitted).
132
Piarowski v. Illinois Community College District 515, 759 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir.
1985) (concluding that Amendment protects “purely artistic” expression—“art for art’s
sake”).
133
Cf. Adler, supra note 10, at 1366 (internal citation omitted) (quoting post-modern
painter David Salle as saying that his paintings are about “all the paintings I won’t make or
can’t make.”).
134
Tolstoy—whom Wittgenstein “admired and read constantly,” Brand, supra note 97,
at 311—suggested that creating nonsense was perhaps the only thing that humans could do
that their own creator could not. Id. (“God can do everything, it is true, but there is one
thing he cannot do, and that is speak nonsense.”) (quoting LEO TOLSTOY, THE GOSPEL
ACCORDING TO TOLSTOY (1992)).
129
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itself,” and are in that way “disinterested and ruleless, unconstrained by . . .
appetite” or “a master concept to which they must conform.”135 Art is
therefore important for individual autonomy precisely because its lack of
meaning removes it from the realm of knowledge.136
This is not to say that the autonomy principle provides an unmitigated
case for protecting nonsense. Some forms of covert nonsense can arguably
interfere with individual autonomy, rather than advancing it. Misleading
covert nonsense, for example, can further the autonomy of the person
speaking it while simultaneously interfering with the autonomy of those
tricked by it.137 Moreover, if autonomy is intertwined with rational
cognition, covert nonsense might be a threat to autonomy, instead of a
means to advance it. Many leading proponents of the autonomy approach
seem to hold this view. Redish, for example, refers to “the instrumental
value in developing individuals’ mental faculties so that they may reach
their full intellectual potential.”138 Fred Schauer has similarly described the
self-realization view of the Amendment as being based on the human
potential for “personal growth, self-fulfillment, and the development of
rational faculties.”139 If these views are correct, then autonomy is limited by
rationality, and nonsense might lack constitutional salience precisely
because it is not subject to analysis on the basis of its rationality.
3. Democracy

135

Anthony T. Kronman, Is Poetry Undemocratic?, 16 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 311, 324

(1999).
136

Id. (“Judgments of beauty are thus free in a twofold sense. They are neither driven
by desire nor determined by a rule.”). See also Charlton, supra note 4, at 356–59
(evaluating nonsense in terms of Kant’s three types of aesthetic effect—the beautiful, the
sublime, and the funny—and concluding that the former provides the best “clue”); Harry
Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 16 (1960)
(“[B]eauty has constitutional status too, and . . . the life of the imagination is as important
to the human adult as the life of the intellect.”); Nahmod, supra note 81, at 231 (“Because
art is removed from knowledge and desire, it follows for Kant that art and the beautiful
cannot express ideas or take positions.”).
137
Cf. Allen Blair, A Matter of Trust: Should No-Reliance Clauses Bar Claims for
Fraudulent Inducement of Contract?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 423, 456 (2009) (“Neo-Kantians
tend to agree that lying is an affront to autonomy. Lies interfere with the victim's rational
deliberation and rob the victim of her prospects for making at least some sensible choices
about a course of action or belief.”).
138
MARTIN REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 30 (1984)
(emphasis added). In his original defense of the autonomy position, Scanlon argued that, on
a Millian approach, “the powers of a state are limited to those that citizens could recognize
while still regarding themselves as equal, autonomous, rational agents.” Scanlon, A
Theory of Freedom of Expression, supra note 114, at 215.
139
FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 49 (1982).
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The final major First Amendment value is democracy. As with the
autonomy and marketplace approaches, democratic theories of the First
Amendment come in many forms. Perhaps most famously, Alexander
Meiklejohn argued that the Amendment categorically protects political
speech (and only political speech) against government interference.140
Robert Bork took a similar, albeit narrower, view.141 More recently, Robert
Post has argued that the primary value animating the First Amendment is
that of “democratic legitimation”: the notion that “First Amendment
coverage should extend to all efforts deemed normatively necessary for
influencing public opinion.”142
Because democratic approaches to the First Amendment seem to be
based on the content of speech acts,143 it might not be immediately apparent
how nonsense—which lacks cognitive content of any kind—can be entitled
to protection. After all, nonsense does not directly convey information
about voting. And yet many people with strong incentive to think about the
issue seem to believe that nonsense and democracy are connected. The
leaders of totalitarian states, for example, often ban nonrepresentational and
nonsensical art.144 Sheldon Nahmod points to the Soviet Union, whose
leaders believed that “art should only serve to reinforce socialist ideals and
thereby inculcate appropriate behavior; nonrepresentational art was

140

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
94 (1948) [hereinafter MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH] (“The guarantee given by the First
Amendment is not, then, assured to all speaking. It is assured only to speech which bears,
directly or indirectly, upon issues with which voters have to deal—only, therefore, to the
consideration of matters of public interest.”); see also id. at 255–57 (arguing that the First
Amendment encompasses all “public” speech that enables citizens to participate in
democratic governance). As noted above, Meiklejohn considered this approach broad
enough to include “novels and dramas and paintings and poems.” Id. at 263.
141
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 29 (1971) (arguing that the First Amendment protects only “criticisms of public
officials and policies, proposals for the adoption or repeal of legislation or constitutional
provisions and speech addressed to the conduct of any governmental unit in the country”).
142
POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 15, at 18.
143
See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 140, at 26–27. Because Post
focuses on media of communication, this is not necessarily true of Post’s approach, though
elsewhere I have questioned whether his theory can really avoid an inquiry into speech’s
content. Joseph Blocher, Public Discourse, Expert Knowledge, and the Press, 87 U. WASH.
L. REV. 409, 417-23 (2012).
144
See Hamilton, supra note 111, at 98–100 (discussing examples from China, Eastern
Europe, Nazi Germany, and elsewhere); see also Eberle, supra note 123, at 12–13; cf.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (“Music is one of the oldest
forms of human expression. From Plato’s discourse in the Republic to the totalitarian state
in our own times, rules have known its capacity to appeal to the intellect and to the
emotions, and have censored musical compositions to serve the needs of the state.”).
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considered decadent, bourgeois and dangerous.”145 Whether or not that fear
is well-founded, it certainly is not unique to Russia, nor even to totalitarian
states. As Hamilton notes, “[c]onventional readings of Plato, for example,
indicate that he believed that art should be censored because it threatens
order and stability.”146 Speech, including art, need not be meaningful in
order to destabilize.
But this only explains why some states might seek to suppress nonsense,
not why democracies should protect it. What positive democratic value does
overt nonsense serve? Perhaps, like art, nonsense can help cultivate the kind
of citizen on whom a well-functioning democracy depends. Meiklejohn, for
example, argued that “[l]iterature and the arts must be protected by the First
Amendment. They lead the way toward sensitive and informed appreciation
and response to the values out of which the riches of the general welfare are
created.”147 This may be a bit of a stretch even on its own terms, but it does
suggest a possible connection between nonsense and democracy. Just as
engaging with nonsense can help people perceive cognitive truths in the
marketplace for ideas,148 perhaps it can also inform their understanding and
appreciation of what Brandeis referred to as “political truth.”149
A second possibility is that overt nonsense serves as a kind of “safety
valve”—a way to release what might otherwise become dangerous
dissent.150 On this reading, speech “is an essential mechanism for
maintaining the balance between stability and change.”151 The Merry
Pranksters, whose escapades in their brightly-decorated bus were
catalogued in The Electric Kool Aid Acid Test,152 often “tootled the
multitudes,” which referred “to the way a Prankster would stand with a flute
on the bus’s roof and play sounds to imitate people’s various reactions to
the bus.”153 Such activity probably did not convey any particularized
message or “idea.” But without that outlet, perhaps the Pranksters’
basically-nonsensical hijinks would have devolved into something more
145

Nahmod, supra note 81, at 225; see also Tushnet, supra note 9, at 172 (noting
“Nazi Germany’s suppression of ‘degenerate’ art and Soviet Russia’s promotion of
socialist realist art at the expense of abstraction”).
146
Hamilton, supra note 111, at 76.
147
See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT.
REV. 245, 256–57.
148
See supra 109-112 and accompanying text.
149
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
150
See, e.g., Stephen G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially
Worthless Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2008) (describing safety valve theory).
151
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970).
152
TOM WOLFE, THE ELECTRIC KOOL AID ACID TEST (1968).
153
Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, Ken Kesey, Author of ‘Cuckoo’s Nest,’ Who Defined
the Psychedelic Era, Dies at 66, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001. See WOLFE, supra note 152,
at Chapter 8 (“Tootling the Multitudes”).
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destructive.
A related argument for extending constitutional protection to nonsense
draws on institutional considerations that are especially salient for, but not
specific to, democracy conceptions of the First Amendment: that the
Amendment must protect nonsense in order to fully insulate valuable and
meaningful speech. The Supreme Court has long recognized that “First
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive.”154 This proposition
is based on the belief that speech “is delicate and vulnerable, as well as
supremely precious in our society. The threat of sanctions may deter their
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions.”155
Doctrine has been significantly shaped by that belief, perhaps most
prominently in the context of First Amendment standing doctrine, which
permits people to attack on free speech grounds laws that would concededly
be constitutional as applied to them,156 so long as the law reaches a
substantial amount of protected speech.157
The nothingness of nonsense could be exactly the kind of breathing
space that sense needs in order to thrive. After all, the Court has recognized
that if only truthful speech were protected, people would “tend to make only
statements which ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone.’”158 Perhaps if only
meaningful speech were protected, people would shy away from pushing
the boundaries of logic and language, for fear of speaking unprotected
nonsense. As the Court held in Cohen, “forbid[ding] particular words . . .
also run[s] a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.”159
Nonsense might merit protection precisely because of its instrumental value
in protecting meaningful speech.
II. THE MEANING OF MEANING FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The discussion up until this point has described an important but underexplored category of speech—nonsense—and made a preliminary case for
its constitutional protection. In the course of doing so, it has flanked another
target: the very concept of meaning itself. This is dangerous quarry,
particularly when wounded by the apparent threat to its claim on the First
Amendment’s territory, and is not to be approached incautiously. With due
concern for the hazards, though, it is difficult to imagine a better way to
154

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
Id.
156
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
157
Id. at 615.
158
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964) (quoting Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
159
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
155
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consider meaning than by, as the preceding discussion has, exploring its
absence. The goal of this Part is to use that analysis to confront the meaning
of meaning for First Amendment purposes.
It would be easier, perhaps, to avoid the issue by simply saying that
meaning does not matter for the First Amendment. But a wide range of
doctrine and scholarship suggest that the easy road is foreclosed, and that
meaning—generally equated with ideas, viewpoints, or content—is a
necessary ingredient of constitutionally salient speech. As John Greenman
notes, “[f]requently, behavior is said to be covered by the First Amendment
if it conveys ‘ideas’ or ‘information.’”160 This meaning-dependent approach
is embedded in constitutional doctrine in various ways, and has been
buttressed by thoughtful scholarship. Peter Tiersma, for example, proposes
that “the first requirement for communication by conduct is that the conduct
be meaningful, most often as a matter of convention. This is simply an
extension of a basic principle of language: a speaker normally cannot use
sounds to communicate unless the sounds have some meaning attached to
them.”161 Likewise, Melville Nimmer’s influential account of symbolic
speech holds that “symbolic speech requires not merely that given conduct
results in a meaning effect, but that the actor causing such conduct must
intend such a meaning effect by his conduct.”162
But the meaning-dependent approach also raises difficult problems for
the reasons suggested in Part I: nonsense is pervasive, and much of it has a
strong relationship to the First Amendment’s core values. Moreover, despite
their apparent insistence on the importance of meaning, courts and scholars
have done very little to establish what meaning means.163 That imprecision,
160

Greenman, supra note 3, at 1347. See also Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct:
Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,”
and the Unchartered Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1304 (2005) (“Under nearly every
theory of free speech, the right to free speech is at its core the right to communicate—to
persuade and to inform people through the content of one’s message.”).
161
Tiersma, supra note 3, at 1559. Under Tiersma’s two-part test for determining
whether nonverbal communication falls within the freedom of speech: “First, action must
have meaning, either by way of convention or in some other manner. Second, the actor
must intend to communicate by means of the action.” Id. at 1526. “An intent to
communicate obviously requires an intent to convey information.” Id. at 1561.
162
Nimmer, Symbolic Speech, supra note 3, at 37. Nimmer explained elsewhere that
“[t]he meaning effect is a signal that registers in the mind of at least one observer. The
nonmeaning effect is the physical effect of the act and is not dependent upon the reaction of
other minds.” MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3.06[C], at 3–45
(1989). As noted above, despite its reliance on meaning Nimmer considered his approach
broad enough to reach artistic speech lacking verbal and cognitive content. Nimmer,
Symbolic Speech, supra note 3, at 35.
163
Cf. Greenman, supra note 3, at 1338-39 (“Everybody knows that communication is
important, but nobody knows how to define it. The best scholars refer to it. Free-speech
law protects it. Smart people tell us that the Internet should be structured to promote it. But
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in turn, provides space to craft a doctrinal and theoretical apparatus that
allows meaning to play a central role in First Amendment discourse without
completely denying constitutional coverage to nonsense. Even so, this is no
easy task, for the necessary tools are scarce and scattered throughout the
First Amendment’s messy workshop.
Fortunately, craftsmen in adjacent workshops can provide useful
guidance. The relationship between meaning and language has been the
central obsession of analytic philosophy for the better part of a century. Of
course, analytic philosophers are primarily concerned with determining
what can meaningfully be said, not what kinds of speech are or should be
protected from government sanction. But with regard to the specific issue of
meaning, their hard-won advances are directly relevant to the questions that
constitutional law has set for itself. Moreover, as the following discussion
shows, echoes of their efforts can already be heard in First Amendment
discourse.
Two major schools of thought have emerged, which with regrettably
necessary simplification can be called the “conceptual” and “use”
approaches to meaning. The former, associated with early Wittgenstein,
Russell, and logical positivism, finds meaning in the connection between
language and extra-linguistic concepts.164 Language that fails to represent
such concepts is nonsensical. Some First Amendment discourse implicitly
utilizes such an approach. The authorities cited above, for example,
generally employ a more-or-less conceptual approach to meaning by
searching for “ideas”165 or “content.”166 The frequent scholarly explorations
of nonrepresentational art also seem motivated by a conceptual approach,
for their issue is only distinct to the degree that representationalism itself is
constitutionally salient.
The lessons of analytic philosophy suggest that these are the wrong
questions to ask. As Paul Chevigny explains:
Having abandoned the view of language as a ‘copy’ of
the ‘real world,’ a set of names for objects, and assertions
that have meaning only to the extent that they faithfully
represent reality, philosophers increasingly think of language
as a system of discourse in which assertions can have
‘meaning’ and be ‘true’ not as representations of ‘reality’ but
no one—no scholar or judge—has successfully captured it. Few have even tried.”).
164
“Conceptual” is used here as a rough and imperfect label for many related schools
of thought, from foundationalism to logical positivism. Paying the inevitable costs of oversimplification nevertheless seems worthwhile, since my purpose here is not to illuminate
anything specific to those philosophies, but simply to show how, generally speaking, they
might inform the First Amendment.
165
Greenman, supra note 3, at 1347.
166
Volokh, supra note 160, at 1304.
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as ideas for which good reasons can be found in other parts
of the system of discourse.167
That is, if meaning is relevant for First Amendment purposes it must be
found in the way language is used, not in what it represents. The following
discussion attempts to show what that entails as a constitutional matter and
why it represents an improvement over the conceptual approach. And yet
bringing use meaning to the forefront of First Amendment doctrine drags
with it a new set of problems, including the inherent difficulty of identifying
the “language games” that imbue speech with meaning.
The goal of this Part is to suggest how First Amendment discourse and
doctrine can fruitfully utilize the concept of meaning, not to fully define
speech, say anything new about analytic philosophy, or—heaven forbid—
provide an original or comprehensive reading of Wittgenstein.168 The
following accounts of analytic philosophy will feel familiar, if simplified, to
philosophers; the First Amendment theory and doctrine will be familiar to
legal scholars. Indeed, this is far from the first article to suggest connections
between them. But its angle of approach—through the region of nonsense—
is novel for First Amendment scholarship, and it aims to provide a fresh and
useful, if complicated and imperfect, way to think about meaning for First
Amendment purposes.
A. Conceptual Meaning
In 1899, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote: “We must think things not
words, or at least we must constantly translate our words into the facts for
which they stand, if we are to keep to the real and the true.”169 For a man
whose contribution to American jurisprudence can largely be measured by
his total mastery of words,170 this might come as something of a surprise.
167

Chevigny, supra note 85, at 162.
Wittgenstein’s influence is so magnetic that the very act of citing him has become a
language game of its own. See Steven L. Winter, For What It’s Worth, 26 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 789, 796–97 (1992) (noting signaling value of citations to Wittgenstein “in some
legal academic circles”); see also Dennis W. Arrow, “Rich,” “Textured,” and “Nuanced”:
Constitutional “Scholarship” and Constitutional Messianism at the Millenium, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 149, 149 n.1a (1999) (positing same phenomenon with regard to law review editors).
169
Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443,
460 (1899); see also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (May 9, 1925),
in 1 Holmes-Laski Letters 738 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) (noting how difficult it is
to “think accurately—and think things not words”) (quoted in Post, Recuperating, supra
note 34, at 1250 (“Our First Amendment jurisprudence has become increasingly a doctrine
of words merely, not of things.”)).
170
Richard A. Posner, Introduction to OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. xvii (Richard A. Posner ed., The University
168
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The remark suggests that the meaning of words lies in “the facts for which
they stand.” In that way, it is emblematic of what might be called the
“conceptual” approach to meaning—one that locates meaning in the
relationship between language and extra-linguistic concepts.171 Words that
do not denote such concepts are nonsensical and, if the doctrinal
descriptions set out above are accurate, fall outside the boundaries of the
First Amendment. But as the remainder of this Section shows, such a
conceptual approach has serious defects as a guide for constitutional law.
Holmes was a pragmatist,172 and though his circle of scientifically and
philosophically inclined friends was broad and deep,173 it did not
necessarily include those in Vienna and Cambridge who were concurrently
exploring the relationship between “things” and “words.” Even as Holmes
was penning his monumentally influential free speech opinions, and
essentially giving the First Amendment its first normative theory,174 those
thinkers—Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein prominent but not
alone among them—were probing the meaning of meaning itself.175
In the early 1900s, Russell was perhaps the world’s preeminent logician
and mathematician. His Principia Mathematica was published in the 1910s,
just a few years before Holmes laid the normative foundations of the First
Amendment. As part of his wide-ranging intellectual explorations, Russell
contemplated what it means for a statement to have meaning. He eventually
came to believe that statements are meaningful, even if not verifiable, so
long as they express a possible state of affairs: “A sentence ‘p’ is significant
if ‘I believe that p’ or ‘I doubt that’ or etc., can describe a perceived fact.”176
of Chicago Press 1992).
171
This does not mean, of course, that each word has only one thing to which it is
connected. As Holmes noted elsewhere, “[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content
according to the circumstances and time in which it is used.” Towne v. Eisner, 38 S. Ct.
158, 159 (1918). Conversely, the same “thing” may be connected to multiple words, as in
Gottlob Frege’s famous example of the “Morning Star” and “Evening Star,” both of which
refer to Venus.
172
See generally Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV.
787, 799 (1989)
173
See generally LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2002) (describing social
and intellectual “club” that included such luminaries as Holmes, William James, and
Charles Peirce).
174
Post, Reconciling, supra note 75, at 2356.
175
Starting with Russell and Cambridge means omitting any number of important
thinkers, including Gottlob Frege and the Austrian logical positivists, who arguably
deserve credit for the very creation of analytic philosophy. However costly, such omissions
are necessary for the sake of brevity and clarity. Fuller accounts can be found in Richard
Rorty, The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method (1992).
176
BERTRAND RUSSELL, AN INQUIRY INTO MEANING AND TRUTH 181 (1940) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Thus a statement like “The King of France is bald” can be meaningful
because it denotes a concept, even though the thing it denotes does not
exist.177 Statements that fail to denote are nonsensical. Russell’s famous
example of such nonsense was the statement “Quadruplicity drinks
procrastination.”178
At around the same time as he was developing this approach to
meaning, Russell took on a new pupil, whom he at first referred to as “[m]y
ferocious German . . . armour-plated against all assaults of reasoning.”179
Within one term, Russell learned that his German was Austrian and quite
capable of his own assaultive reasoning. Russell was enraptured: “I love
him & feel he will solve the problems I am too old to solve.”180 The
ferocious Austrian was, of course, Wittgenstein. For him, as Dennis
Paterson says, “all philosophical problems [were] ultimately problems of
language.”181 Although the focus on problems of language was consistent
throughout Wittgenstein’s career, his approach to them can be divided into
two basically distinct phases, only the first of which fits the conceptual
mold described here. For the “early” Wittgenstein, author of the
spectacularly impenetrable Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, sense consisted
in “a determinate relation between a proposition and an independent state of
affairs.”182
In order to explore their “relation,” Wittgenstein focused on the
relationship between thought and expression. As the preface or “frame” of
the Tractatus explained:
The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather—
not to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for, in
order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to
think both sides of the limit (we should therefore have to
think what cannot be thought). The limit can, therefore, only
be drawn in language and what lies on the side of the limit
will be simply nonsense.183
That limit represents the boundary of both meaning and of reality. As
Wittgenstein explained in the koan-like propositions of the book itself: “The
proposition is a picture of reality. The proposition is a model of the reality
177

See generally Bertrand Russell, On Denoting, 14 MIND 479 (1905).
RUSSELL, AN INQUIRY, supra note 176, at 165.
179
RAY MONK, LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN: THE DUTY OF GENIUS 40 (1990)
180
Id. at 41.
181
Patterson, Law’s Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 938.
182
Brand, supra note 97, at 314. See also Kavka, supra note 73, at 1457 (reviewing
HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE (1972)) (concluding that the
Tractatus is based on the belief that “the function of language is to model or picture the
world.”).
183
WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 13, at Preface.
178
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as we think it is.”184 Anything that is not a proposition is, strictly speaking,
nonsense, for anything that is not a proposition fails to present a picture of
reality: “Only the proposition has sense; only in the context of a proposition
has a name meaning.”185 It follows that there is no way to comprehend or
create reality but through language, and thus “[t]he limits of my language
mean the limits of my world.”186
This does not necessarily mean, however, that all concepts are reducible
to language.187 Wittgenstein was obsessed with the notion that some things
“cannot be expressed by proposition, but only shown; which I believe is the
cardinal problem of philosophy.”188 As Elizabeth Anscombe, a
distinguished philosopher and former student of Wittgenstein’s, later
explained:
[A]n important part is played in the Tractatus by the things
which, though they cannot be “said”, are yet “shewn” or
“displayed”. That is to say: it would be right to call them
“true” if, per impossible, they could be said; in fact they
cannot be called true, since they cannot be said, but “can be
shewn”, or “are exhibited”, in the propositions saying the
various things that can be said.189
Whatever their importance, attempts to say these things inevitably result in
nonsense. Holmes seemed to have something similar in mind when he
suggested the difference between thinking things and thinking words.190
Though Wittgenstein himself would apparently later abandon it,191 the
effort to find meaning in the relationship between words and things
certainly did not end with the Tractatus. The influence of the conceptual
approach is palpable in the work of A.J. Ayer, the great English logical
positivist, whose Language, Truth, and Logic defends among other things
the “verifiability principle.”192 That principle holds that statements are
nonsensical where they are not analytically or empirically verifiable.193 A
184

Id. at § 4.01.
Id. § 3.3.
186
Id. § 3.032 (“It is impossible to present in language anything that ‘contradicts logic’
as it is in geometry to present by its coordinates a figure that contradicts the laws of space
or to give the coordinates of a point that does not exist.”).
187
See supra notes 93-108 and accompanying text (describing debate between
“ineffable” and “resolute” readings of Wittgenstein).
188
DAVID G. STERN, WITTGENSTEIN ON MIND AND LANGUAGE, 79-70 (1996).
189
ANSCOMBE, supra note 94, at 162.
190
See Holmes, supra note 169, at 460.
191
See infra 215-216 and accompanying text.
192
ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (1952).
193
Id. at 44. Chevigny, supra note 85, at 163 (“If a proposition was not true or false by
definition or did not give rise to an empirical prediction that could, in principle, be verified,
the proposition was meaningless.”).
185
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similar focus on verifiability seems to underlie popular intuitions about the
relationship between meaning and truth. For example, “the threshold for
inclusion in Wikipedia is verifiability, not truth—that is, whether readers
are able to check that material added to Wikipedia has already been
published by a reliable source, not whether we think it is true.”194
The influence of the conceptual approach extends, albeit uncredited, to
First Amendment doctrine itself. This is perhaps most apparent in what
John Greenman calls the Supreme Court’s “ideaism”—the principle that
“behavior is . . . covered by the First Amendment if it conveys ‘ideas’ or
‘information.’”195 The notion that ideas—cognitive meaning, in other
words—are the focus of the First Amendment is so often repeated that it
might sometimes pass unnoticed. In New York Times v. Sullivan,196 the
Supreme Court explained that the Amendment’s “constitutional safeguard .
. . ‘was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people.’”197 Since then,
the Court has often invoked the principle that “[t]he First Amendment . . .
embodies ‘our profound national commitment to the free exchange of
ideas.’”198 In Miller v. California,199 for example, the Court seemed to
suggest that ideas are so important that the existence of one is sufficient for
constitutional coverage: “All ideas having even the slightest redeeming
social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of the
[First Amendment’s] guarantees.”200 By the same logic, the Court has also
indicated that putative speech acts such as fighting words and obscenity
essentially fall outside the boundaries of the First Amendment in part
because they “are no essential part of any exposition of ideas.”201
194

Wikipedia: Verifiability, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:
Verifiability (quoted in POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 15, at 8 (2012)).
195
Greenman, supra note 3, at 1347-48.
196
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
197
Id. at 269 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)); see also Mosley
v. Police Dep’t, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972) (“[O]ur people are guaranteed the right to
express any thought, free from government censorship.” (quoting New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)) (citations omitted)).
198
New York State Bd. of Elections v. Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008) (“The First
Amendment creates a marketplace where ideas, most especially political ideas, may
compete without government interference”.); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003)
(“The hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow ‘free trade in ideas’ . . . .”).
199
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
200
Id. at 20 (internal citation omitted).
201
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). It also matters that
such speech acts “are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). See also Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing
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A conceptual approach to meaning similarly seems to animate some of
the Court’s efforts to define what kinds of non-verbal conduct qualify for
First Amendment coverage. By now “[i]t is well settled that the First
Amendment’s protections extend to nonverbal ‘expressive conduct’ or
‘symbolic speech.’”202 And meaning seems to be the ingredient that makes
that extension possible. In West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, for example, the Court indicated that expressive conduct (in that
case, saluting a flag) is “speech” for constitutional purposes because it
conveys “ideas.”203 A similar premise seems to animate Spence v.
Washington,204 the Court’s most direct effort to define the essential
elements that transform sound into speech. In that case, the Court set out to
evaluate whether conduct is “sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication to fall within the scope” of the First Amendment.205 The
test it created asks whether “an intent to convey a particularized message
was present, and whether the likelihood was great that the message would
be understood by those who viewed it.”206 Conduct that satisfies both
prongs of this test is considered to be expression. Spence therefore
effectively doubles down on the importance of conceptual meaning,
requiring both that the speaker intend to convey it (in “particularized” form,
Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003) (denying First Amendment protection to fraud,
on the basis that “the ‘intentional lie’ is ‘no essential part of any exposition of ideas’”).
202
Amy Adler, Girls! Girls! Girls!: The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1108, 1114 n.18 (2005).
203
319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (“Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of
communicating ideas.”).
204
Tiersma, supra note 3, at 1537 (referring to Spence as “the only real test that the
Court has articulated to identify ‘speech’ in the First Amendment sphere”). Tiersma’s use
of “only” was probably accurate at the time, but now needs some qualification, since
Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557
(1995), and other cases seem to have replaced or at the very least altered Spence’s test. For
example, in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47
(2006), rather than applying (or even citing) Spence, the Court asked whether the activity at
issue was “inherently expressive,” such that a viewer could understand its meaning without
further explanation. Id. at 66. Excluding military recruiters from campus in order to express
disagreement with the military’s policies did not meet this test, the Court found, because
such exclusion might well be the result of room scarcity. Id.
205
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (“Johnson’s burning of the flag was conduct ‘sufficiently imbued
with elements of communication’ to implicate the First Amendment.” (quoting Spence, 418
U.S. at 409)). But see Johnson, 491 U.S. at 432 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[F]lag
burning is the equivalent of an inarticulate grunt or roar . . . .”).
206
Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11; see R. George Wright, What Counts as “Speech” in
the First Place?: Determining the Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217,
1238 (2010) (“In the absence of the speaker’s intent to promote some more or less
determinate understanding, we may be skeptical that speech in the constitutional sense is
present.”).
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no less), and also that there be a “great” likelihood that the audience
understand it.
Despite its frequent appearances in First Amendment doctrine, the
conceptual approach to meaning is a poor guide to what speech the First
Amendment actually does or should protect. Indeed, the conceptual
approach to meaning, combined with the meaning-dependent approach to
the First Amendment discussed above,207 leads to all the problems of underinclusion suggested by Part I. As Greenman points out, ideaism “fails to
predict what the First Amendment actually covers.”208 In O’Brien v. United
States,209 the Court clarified that the mere intent to convey meaning is not
sufficient for First Amendment coverage: “We cannot accept the view that
an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever
the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”210
Nor is a connection between language and concept necessary for the
Amendment’s protections to attach. Music, for example, is clearly protected
by the First Amendment,211 even though a great deal of it does not convey
meaning in any standard sense. As Richard Posner writes, “[e]ven if
‘thought,’ ‘concept,’ ‘idea,’ and ‘opinion’ are broadly defined, these are not
what most music conveys; and even if music is regarded as a language, it is
not a language for encoding ideas and opinions.”212 In other ways, too, the
Constitution protects efforts to say the unsayable. Justice Harlan explained
in Cohen v. California that “much linguistic expression serves a dual
communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively
precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as
well.”213
207

See supra 160-162 and accompanying text.
Greenman, supra note 3, at 1348. See also Post, Recuperating, supra note 34, at
1252 (showing that Spence is overinclusive); Rubenfeld, supra note 35, at 773 (showing
that Spence is underinclusive).
209
391 U.S. 367 (1968)
210
Id. at 376 (analyzing constitutional status of social dancing).
211
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (“Music, as a form of
expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment.”); see also Reed
v. Vill. of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 950 (7th Cir. 1983) (“If the defendants passed an
ordinance forbidding the playing of rock and roll music . . . they would be infringing a First
Amendment right even if the music had no political message—even if it had no words.”
(internal citations omitted)).
212
Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1093 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
concurring), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); see also
David Munkittrick, Music as Speech: A First Amendment Category Unto Itself, 62 FED.
COMM. L.J. 665, 668 (2010). But see Rosen, supra note 54, (“Felix Mendelssohn found the
meaning of music more precise, not less, than language, but that is because music means
what it is, not what it says.”).
213
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (emphasis added).
208
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Under the conceptual approach to meaning, expression of the
“inexpressible” is by definition nonsensical.214 But as Justice Harlan
suggests and Part I argues, it is also properly covered by the First
Amendment. It follows that the conceptual approach to meaning, whatever
its intuitive appeal, is a poor guide to the boundaries of the First
Amendment. If it is to matter, “meaning” must lie elsewhere than in the
relationship between speech and concepts.
B. Use Meaning
The best place to begin constructing an alternative to the conceptual
approach associated with Russell and Wittgenstein is with Wittgenstein
himself. His later work—especially the enormously influential concept of
language games—reshaped the whole of analytic philosophy, putting it on
the “linguistic turn” that led to speech act theory, ordinary language
philosophy, and a host of other important developments. In them emerges a
new way of thinking about language and meaning that is ultimately a better
guide for the First Amendment.
After leaving philosophical work behind for more than a decade,
Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in 1929 and took a new approach to the
relationship between language, meaning, and the world. This work
culminated in the posthumous publication of Philosophical Investigations.
It was here that Wittgenstein “reject[ed] the search for a unified account of
language’s internal logic, which had occupied the bulk . . . the
Tractatus.”215 Indeed, he described the Philosophical Investigations as a
rejoinder to “what logicians have said about the structure of language.
(Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.)”216
Instead of the picture theory of meaning that animated his earlier work,
Wittgenstein now focused on “language games” as defining the limits of
meaning and, therefore, the world: “I shall call the whole, consisting of the
language and the actions into which it is woven, the language-game.”217 The
term, he said, was “meant to bring into prominence the fact that the
speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.”218 The
214

AYER, supra note 192, at 118 (“If a mystic admits that the object of his vision is
something which cannot be described, then he must also admit that he is bound to talk
nonsense when he describes it.”).
215
Ian Bartrum, Constructing the Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic Evolution of
Federalist 10, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 11 (2010).
216
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 30, at 11-12.
217
Id. at 7.
218
Id. at 23; see also Thomas P. Crocker, Displacing Dissent: The Role of ‘Place’ in
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 2613 (2007) (“‘Form of life’
is a technical term meant to convey the multiplicity of both possible ways of living and
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nature of these games became Wittgenstein’s focus for the rest of his life.
As Patterson explains, “The central tenet of Wittgenstein’s writing after
1929 is that knowledge is not achieved by the individual subject’s grasp of a
connection between word and object. Rather, knowledge turns out to be the
grasp of the topography of a word’s uses in activities into which language is
woven.”219
The language games approach locates meaning in language’s use, not in
its representation of the world. As Wittgenstein put in the Philosophical
Investigations, “[f]or a large class of cases—though not for all—in which
we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a
word is its use in the language.”220 The way to identify meaning, therefore,
is not necessarily to ask whether a putative speaker has given content to
signs in his propositions, but rather whether he has followed the rules of the
relevant language game. Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson explain: “As a
tradition now identified with Wittgenstein and his successors insists, there
are only ‘practices,’ each constituted by inchoate and unformalizable
standards that establish one’s statements . . . as ‘legitimately assertable’ by
persons within the interpretive community that constitutes the practice in
question.”221
The tradition to which Balkin and Levinson refer is now dominant, or at
least ascendant, in analytic philosophy. Thus the later Wittgenstein is
important not only on his own terms, but because he shaped so many other
philosophical developments throughout the past century.222 The branches on
that tree are too numerous to count and too complex to describe, but include
the work of Paul Grice,223 the speech act theory associated most closely
possible ways of seeing and responding to the world. The ability to speak a language is the
ability to engage in practices within a form of life in which that language has meaning.”).
219
Dennis Patterson, Conscience and the Constitution, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 270, 303–
04 (1993) (internal citation omitted); see also Fiss, supra note 29, at 177.
220
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 30, at 43. See also
Jonathan Yovel, What is Contract Law ‘About’? Speech Act Theory and a Critique of
‘Skeletal Promises’, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 937, 939 (2000) (noting that Wittgenstein and the
theories of performative language that owe him a debt “all share a basic insight: that
language is not primarily about meaning in the traditional, semantical sense associated with
representationalism (and much of standard structural linguistics). Rather, in this view,
language is primarily about action—speech and texts are acts, and they perform things in
the social world and bring about different kinds of effects.”).
221
Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Performing Arts, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 1597, 1604 (1991);
222
Chevigny, supra note 85, at 162.
223
Grice’s basic argument—vastly oversimplified—was that for A to mean something
by doing X, X must be uttered with an intention of producing some belief or effect in the
listener, B, by means of B’s recognition of A’s intent. See generally H.P. Grice, Meaning,
66 PHIL. REV. 377 (1957) (describing idea of M-meaning). Later, Grice would further
develop the idea of speaker meaning via analyzing sentences as units of meaning and
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with J.L. Austin and John R. Searle,224 and ordinary language philosophy.225
Most importantly for present purposes, the use meaning approach has
gained traction in First Amendment doctrine and scholarship. Robert Post,
for example, argues that Marcel Duchamp’s The Fountain—a urinal turned
on its side—is properly recognized as artistic speech precisely because of
the shared norms of the artistic community.226 This is because it is a “form[]
of communication that sociologically we recognize as art.”227 Taking a
similar approach, Amy Adler points to the example of Annie Sprinkle, a
performance artist who also works in the pornography industry: “When
asked if anything made Sprinkle’s performance at the Kitchen [Center for
the Performing Arts] ‘art’ and her performance for Screw [Magazine]
‘pornography,’ a spokesman for the Kitchen said, ‘Here it was performed in
an art context.’”228 These are arguments rooted in use, not in representation.
Such examples raise the question of whether the use approach provides
any boundaries whatsoever between meaning and nonsense. Indeed, if not
applied rigorously, the fuzziness inherent in evaluating language games and
social practices can be made to shield nearly any act or utterance.229 But
differentiating between indicative and imperative meaning. H.P. Grice, Utterer’s Meaning,
Sentence Meaning, and Word-Meaning, 4 FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE 225-42 (1968).
224
See generally, J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962); JOHN R.
SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING (1985); JOHN R. SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY (1983);
JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969).
As suggested by the title of Austin’s seminal How To Do Things With Words, the
central insight of speech act theory is that speech can do things, as for example when a
person says “I am sorry.” Uttering those words does not merely report meaning by
describing a situation or a state of mind, but actually performs the act of apologizing. The
same can be said of promises, AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS, supra, at 10, the
words “I do” in the context of a wedding ceremony, id. at 6, or—as Akhil Amar has
suggested, channeling Austin—the phrase “We the People . . . do ordain and establish” in
the Preamble of the United States Constitution. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 5 (2005).
225
Toril Moi, “They Practice Their Trades in Different Worlds”: Concepts in
Poststructuralism and Ordinary Language Philosophy, 40(4) NEW LITERARY HISTORY
801, 802 (2009) (defining ordinary language philosophy as “the philosophical tradition
after Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin as established in [Stanley] Cavell’s work”). See
generally STANLEY CAVELL, MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? (2d ed 2002).
226
Post, Recuperating, supra note 34, at 1253–54; see also Jack M. Balkin, Digital
Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information
Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004).
227
Post, Reply, supra note 15, at 621.
228
Adler, supra note 10, at 1370 (internal citation omitted).
229
Cf. Lee Tien, Publishing Software As a Speech Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 629,
648 (2000) (“[T]he Court seems to believe that every human act has ‘meaning,’ and thus
may convey a ‘message.’”) (citing City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989), in
which the Court concluded that social dancing is not speech, even though “some kernel of
expression” can be found in all human activity).
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while use meaning is potentially more capacious with regard to meaning
than the conceptual approach, it is not all-encompassing. By establishing a
new approach to meaning, the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy simply
creates a new and potentially richer approach to nonsense.230 Rather than
arising from a disjunction between language and extra-linguistic facts,
speech is nonsensical where it fails to adhere to the rules of the relevant
language game.231 Jonathan Yovel explains that “one plays a languagegame by the act of following its rules; deviation from the rules is ‘not
playing the game,’ which produces nonsense in relation to the languagegame in question.”232 Constraints on meaning are therefore inter-subjective
and socially embedded, rather than dictated by the rules of formal logic. In
other words, “for an utterance to be meaningful it must be possible in
principle to subject it to public standards and criteria of correctness.”233
This means that would-be speakers cannot simply declare their words to
be meaningful, and that a “private language”—one whose “individual
words . . . are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to
his immediate private sensations”234—is nonsensical. Carroll provides the
perfect illustration:
“And only one for birthday presents, you know. There’s
glory for you!”
“I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory’,” Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course you
don’t—till I tell you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knock-down
argument for you!’”
“But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock-down
230

Tilghman, supra note 18, at 256 (“Wittgenstein went on to provide a still richer
exploration of nonsense in the Philosophical Investigations where he locates a craving for
nonsense in certain deep aspects of our language and our life. It is this craving that he
believes is responsible for much of traditional philosophy which, on his view, turns out to
be grounded in conceptual confusion and therefore a kind of nonsense.”).
231
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 30, at 18 (“It is only
in a language that I can mean something by something.”).
232
Yovel, supra note 220, at 941; see also Bartrum, supra note 215, at 11 (“[A] word’s
meaning often does not derive from some foundational referent in the world, but, rather, is
determined by the use to which it is properly put within a particular language-game.”
(internal citations omitted)).
233
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 30, at 243; STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 59, at § 3.6 (noting that in the private-language argument
sections of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein “point[s] out that for an utterance
to be meaningful it must be possible in principle to subject it to public standards and
criteria of correctness”).
234
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 30, at 243. Cf.
CHARLES TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE 234 (1985) (“Men speak together, to
each other. Language is fashioned and grows not principally in monologue, but in dialogue,
or better, in the life of the speech community.”).
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argument’,” Alice objected.
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a
scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—
neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make
words mean so many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be
master—that’s all.”235
Humpty Dumpty is speaking a private language, and thus speaking
nonsense, but the question he identifies is essentially the same one asked by
analytic philosophers. After the linguistic turn, at least, they concluded that
use was the master of language, not the other way around.
In a variety of ways, the Supreme Court has indicated the same thing,
suggesting that the First Amendment has at least partially taken its own
linguistic turn with regard to meaning. This is a welcome development both
descriptively and normatively, for the use meaning approach better captures
both the actual contours of existing First Amendment coverage and the
constitutional value of what would otherwise seem to be meaningless
speech.
The First Amendment’s linguistic turn manifests itself in many areas of
doctrine, perhaps most prominently in cases that tinker with Spence’s
conceptualist machinery. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and
Bisexual Group of Boston,236 for example, where the Court assessed the
constitutional salience of a Hibernian pride parade. The Justices conceded
that it was difficult to locate a “narrow, succinctly articulable message” in
the parade,237 but concluded that no such showing was required. A
unanimous Court held that the parade qualified for protection, and that “if
confined to expressions conveying a ‘particularized message,’ [the First
Amendment] would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of
Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of
Lewis Carroll.”238 This is effectively a rejection of the conceptual approach
and an endorsement of the idea that meaning lies in form and use.
Hurley’s almost-cavalier approach to meaning and the First Amendment
has by now received extensive scholarly attention. But the distinction
between the conceptual and use approaches animates many other cases as
well. In Morse v. Frederick,239 the Court upheld the suspension of a high
school student who had unfurled a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS”
235

CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, supra note 46, at 123.
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
237
Id. at 569.
238
Id. at 569 (internal citations omitted).
239
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
236
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at an off-campus school function. The Court conceded that the banner’s
purported message “is cryptic. It is no doubt offensive to some, perhaps
amusing to others. To still others, it probably means nothing at all,”240 but
concluded that the student’s suspension was “consistent with the First
Amendment” because the banner “is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal
drug use.”241 The student himself said, quite plausibly, that “the words were
just nonsense meant to attract television cameras.”242 In dissent, Justice
Stevens similarly concluded that “[t]his is a nonsense message, not
advocacy,”243 and that the school therefore had no sufficient reason to
punish it.
On a strictly conceptual approach, the words “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS”
are as nonsensical as Chomsky’s “colorless green ideas sleep furiously.”244
(If a group of students displayed the latter on a banner, it might also
reasonably be viewed as promoting—or perhaps demonstrating—illegal
drug use.) Indeed, the student’s declaration that the banner was designed to
be nonsense, if accepted, should have taken him outside the realm of Spence
v. Washington, since no “intent to convey a particularized message was
present.”245 To the conceptualist, then, the act involved only nonsense. If
the First Amendment requires the presence of meaning,246 then there was no
constitutional issue to begin with.
Under a use meaning approach, by contrast, the fact that the banner’s
words conveyed no semantic content does not preclude them from having
meaning, which derives from use, not representation. That use, the majority
concluded, imbued them with drug-promoting meaning, not simply
television-attracting meaning. In other words, the use meaning approach can
account for the existence of meaning in the banner, therefore bringing the
case within the boundaries of the First Amendment and enabling the more
substantive and useful debate over whether the majority identified the
correct meaning, and whether the government had sufficient reason to
240

Id. at 401.
Id. at 403.
242
Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2006).
243
Morse, 551 U.S. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 435 (referring to the
“nonsense banner”).
244
CHOMSKY, supra note 61, at 15. See Bill Poser, “The Supreme Court Fails
Semantics,”
LANGUAGE LOG,
http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/
004696.html (last visited June 13, 2012) (“[T]he Court has invalidly inferred a particular
proposition. The slogan is in fact meaningless in the sense that it expresses no proposition,
and Frederick gave a perfectly plausible explanation for the use of a meaningless slogan.
The Court was therefore wrong in finding that the banner advocates the use of
marijuana.”).
245
418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
246
See supra notes 160-162 and accompanying text.
241
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regulate it.247
This is the same basic insight reflected in the First Amendment’s
attention to context as a component of meaning. The conceptual approach is
relatively, if not entirely, acontextual. Whether a word “really” corresponds
to an underlying concept is generally not dependent on the context in which
that word is deployed. But First Amendment doctrine itself is deeply
attuned to the fact that context can create or change meaning.248 Even
Spence recognized that “context may give meaning to the symbol.”249 The
Court there noted that hanging a flag upside down with peace symbols
attached to it related to a “contemporaneous issue of intense public
concern,”250 and that observers were likely to recognize Spence’s point “at
the time that he made it,”251 even though in a different context it “might be
interpreted as nothing more than bizarre behavior.”252 A similar principle
seems to be on display (so to speak) in the Court’s nude dancing cases,
where the Justices have taken pains to distinguish between “bacchanalian
revelries” in barrooms and “a performance by a scantily clad ballet troupe in
a theater.”253
247

The meaning (or lack thereof) of the banner would of course be relevant to that
inquiry. Indeed, some scholars have suggested that nonsense should be free from
government regulation precisely because it lacks meaning. Chevigny, supra note 85, at 164
(arguing that under the early Wittgenstein’s view of ethics as nonsense, the “most
appropriate argument for freedom of speech would be that people ought to be allowed to
say what they please, at least about questions of norms and values, because what they say is
meaningless. The government could have no reason to restrain debates that continue
endlessly without hope of a fruitful result”); see also Tushnet, supra note 9, at 182
(describing “rationality” challenge to regulations of art: “The attack asserts that the grounds
for such regulations are typically so weak that the artworks would be protected by a
substantive due process requirement that exercises of government power must be
minimally rational.”); Catherine L. Amspacher & Randel Steven Springer, Note, Humor,
Defamation and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: The Potential Predicament
for Private Figure Plaintiffs, 31 WM & MARY L. REV. 701, 726 (1990) (“[E]xpressions …
that courts classify as ‘nonsense’ or ‘fantasy’ are protected from defamation suits because,
by definition, no one will believe them to be literally true.”).
248
Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV.
601, 676 (1990) (hereinafter Post, Public Discourse) (“[T]he judgment that speech is being
communicated in a ‘public’ manner ultimately depends upon the particular context of a
specific communicative act . . . .”).
249
418 U.S. at 410.
250
Id. That context included “the invasion of Cambodia and the killings at Kent State
University, events which occurred a few days prior to his arrest.” Id. at 408.
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972); see also Joshua Waldman, Symbolic
Speech and Social Meaning, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1844, 1873 (1997) (“The Supreme Court’s
nude-dancing cases establish the proposition that constitutional significance may be
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Further hints of the use meaning approach can be found in the Supreme
Court’s conclusion that First Amendment coverage extends to practices that
form a “significant medium for the communication of ideas,”254 even if the
specific communication at issue does not successfully convey a
particularized message.255 Robert Post has provided the strongest normative
justification for this approach, arguing that “First Amendment coverage
presumptively extends to media for the communication of ideas, like
newspapers, magazines, the Internet, or cinema, which are the primary
vehicles for the circulation of the texts that define and sustain the public
sphere.”256 It follows that, “in the absence of strong countervailing reasons,
whatever is said within such media is covered by the First Amendment.”257
On this approach, “Jabberwocky” is covered by the First Amendment not
because its words represent concepts, but because it is recognizable as a
poem.
The same basic intuition might be animating the intuitively appealing
but deeply problematic effort to draw a line between “pure speech” and
expressive conduct. The Supreme Court has suggested that pure speech—
apparently conceived as the spoken or written word, with no accompanying
nonverbal action258—should receive complete constitutional coverage,259
apparently without any further inquiry into its meaningfulness. Expresive
conduct, by contrast, is covered only when it is sufficiently imbued with
“communicative elements” as to bring it within the boundaries of the
Amendment.260 In other words, it must, at least according to some accounts,
convey ideas or meaning.261 The pure speech/expressive conduct dichotomy
is deeply problematic262 and ultimately unworkable. But the effort itself
ascribed to the context in which the dancing takes place.”).
254
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
255
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 569 (1995).
256
POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 15, at 20.
257
Id.
258
Carney R. Shegerian, A Sign of the Times: The United States Supreme Court
Effectively Abolishes the Narrowly Tailored Requirement for Time, Place, and Manner
Restrictions, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 453, 471 (1992) (“Pure speech has been generally
defined as communicative expression in a pure state without physical activity.”); Susan J.
Rice, Note, The Search for Valid Governmental Regulations: A Review of the Judicial
Response to Municipal Policies Regarding First Amendment Activities, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 561, 563 (1988).
259
See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
260
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
261
See, e.g., Nimmer, Symbolic Speech, supra note 3, at 37.
262
John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1493-96 (1975) (arguing
that flag-burning is 100% action and 100% expression). See also Tushnet, supra note 9, at
192–99 (describing the “attractions and perils of nominalism,” the idea that “[t]he First
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demonstrates that meaning may lie in form and use, rather than in
representation.263
C. Making the Most of the First Amendment’s Linguistic Turn
Endorsing use meaning as an alternative to the conceptual meaning is
relatively easy; implementing it is not. It should by now be apparent that the
boundaries of the First Amendment cannot be explained on the basis of the
relationship between language and extra-linguistic facts, as the conceptual
meaning approach would suggest. But to say that those boundaries do or
should depend instead on “language games” raises a new, albeit more
useful, set of questions. This final section explores a few of them.
First, the arguments presented above might suggest that basing the
boundaries of the First Amendment on use meaning rather than conceptual
meaning would still be under-inclusive with respect to various First
Amendment values. After all, Section I.B argued that nonsense should be
constitutionally protected in part because it can and does further the central
values of the First Amendment. Most of the examples discussed there were
conceptual nonsense—language or conduct lacking a connection to extralinguistic facts. But it is not hard to imagine how “use nonsense”—private
language—could also further basic First Amendment values like
autonomy.264 And for many of the same reasons laid out in Section I.B.1,
use nonsense might also further the marketplace of ideas. The use meaning
approach might, for example, deny coverage to incidents of lost and found
meaning,265 at least if the action giving rise to the meaning were not itself
recognizable as a form of speech. This could explain why many prominent
First Amendment scholars have rejected a generalist account of the
constitutional value of form,266 focusing instead on the ideas they
Amendment is about speech and the press—about words.”).
263
Post, Recuperating, supra note 34, at 1257 (“The very concept of a medium
presupposes that constitutionally protected expression does not inhere in abstract and
disembodied acts of communication of the kind envisioned by Spence, but is instead
always conveyed through social and material forms of interaction.”).
264
Rosen, supra note 54 (“[W]e are hemmed in, even trapped, by common usage. . . .
[T]he conventions of language and of society are in principle arbitrary—that is, imposed by
will. They prevent the natural development of the individual.”).
265
See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
266
See Nimmer, Symbolic Speech, supra note 3, at 34 n. 22 (“For an exploration of the
thesis that the first amendment protects ideas and not a particular form of expression, see
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1189 (1970).”); Louis Henkin, On Drawing Lines, 83
HARV. L. REV. 63, 79–80 (1968) (“The meaningful constitutional distinction is not between
speech and conduct, but between conduct that speaks, communicates, and other kinds of
conduct. If it is intended as expression, if in fact it communicates, especially if it becomes a
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capture.267
This is a difficult and deceptively complex objection, as is the best
answer to it: that private language, whatever relationships it might have
with the First Amendment’s values, simply is not speech. In other words,
the furtherance of autonomy, ideas, or democracy is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for a particular act or utterance to qualify as “speech”
for constitutional purposes. Consider Jed Rubenfeld’s example of a person
who speeds to express disapproval of speed limits,268 or Tushnet’s example
of ticket scalping.269 These activities undoubtedly advance the autonomy
interests of those engaged in them, and perhaps even communicate ideas.
But so do innumerable other activities, from terrorist attacks to rape.
Prohibition of those activities is perfectly constitutional under the First
Amendment not because the government interest in doing so is sufficiently
strong, but because they are not thought to implicate the First Amendment
at all. To borrow Schauer’s terminology, they are uncovered, not merely
unprotected.270
The question of what constitutes “speech” is, in turn, an old one for First
Amendment theory and doctrine, and the difficulty of articulating anything
like a precise definition is familiar. This Article has focused on one possible
component of speech—meaning—not the concept of speech as a whole.
The two inquiries might be distinct; perhaps meaning must be accompanied
by a volitional act or utterance to constitute speech. To the degree that the
discussion here provides lessons for the quest to define speech itself, it is
that the answers probably lie in social practices rather than in formal
logic.271 In the end, as Frederick Schauer explains, “the very idea of free
speech is a crude implement, to the core, protecting acts that its background
justifications would not protect, and failing to protect acts that its
background justifications would protect.”272
But the crudeness of the implement raises another and perhaps equally
common comprehensible form of expression, it is ‘speech.’”).
267
Nimmer, Symbolic Speech, supra note 3, at 34 (“It is the ideas expressed, and not
just a particular form of expression, that must be the protected if the underlying first
amendment values are to be realized.”).
268
Rubenfeld, supra note 35, at 772 (“But suppose A says that his conduct was
expressive. Suppose he says that driving fast is how he ‘expresses himself.’ Or that he was
‘expressing disagreement’ with the federally mandated speed limit. Or that his speeding
was ‘performance art.’”). .
269
But see Tushnet, supra note 9, at 194 (criticizing the argument that “a reasonably
widespread imputation of roughly the same meaning” can indicate First Amendment
coverage).
270
See Schauer, Categories, supra note 6, at 270-7.
271
This is precisely the quest in which Robert Post has long been engaged. See e.g.,
Post, Recuperating, supra note 34, at 1250.
272
Schauer, Second-Best, supra note 88, at 13.
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foundational challenge for the use meaning approach: negotiating the
tension between the First Amendment’s desire for clear boundaries and
language games’ resistance to them. As to the former, the importance of
clarity in First Amendment doctrine is recognized as an independent value
in its own right.273 Language games, however, are a poor guide for
establishing clear boundaries. Both in their definition and in their behavior,
language games “lack purity.”274 Post, whose First Amendment theory
depends on identifying those boundaries, concludes that although we do not
“have a very clear or hard-edged account” of the boundaries of public
discourse, “it is anthropologically apparent that they do exist and are
reflected in constitutional doctrine.”275 Ordinary language philosophers, too,
embrace this as not merely a necessary drawback, but a positive feature of
their approach. As Toril Moi explains, “[o]ften the blurred concept is
exactly what we want . . . . In many cases . . ., it is useless to spend time and
energy trying to produce a sharp concept.”276
The problem is not simply that language games have fuzzy boundaries,
but that it is difficult to know at what level of generality they should be
defined. After all, “use” can refer to an individual speech act or to a broader
category of speech acts bearing a family resemblance;277 language games
can involve two people, a group, or an entire community. Ordinary
language philosophy typically takes the former route, focusing on the
meaning of particular speech acts. The inevitable result is a kind of caseby-case analysis that requires careful consideration of individual speech
acts.
But whatever its merits as a philosophical approach to language, the
case-by-case approach does not necessarily make for good First
Amendment doctrine. Case-by-case ex post analysis is ill-suited to provide
the kind of articulable ex ante rules that law—and especially First
Amendment doctrine—is generally thought to require.278 First Amendment
273

See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997) (holding a statute void for
vagueness under a First Amendment analysis because of its chilling effect on protected
speech); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (upholding federal injunction against
state court prosecutions under vague state statutes, on the basis of “chilling” effect).
274
Balkin & Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, supra note 37, at 1802. STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 59, at § 3.4 (noting that Wittgenstein “never explicitly defines”
the concept of language-game); Chevigny, supra note 85, at 167 (“Wittgenstein’s
‘language-game’ concept has been criticized for a lack of precision.”).
275
Post, Reply, supra note 15, at 622-23.
276
Moi, supra note 225, at 813–14.
277
See WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 13, § 3.311 (“An expression
presupposes the forms of all propositions in which it can occur. It is the common
characteristic mark of a class of propositions.”).
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See, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (“First, because we
assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws
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language games must be defined with sufficient breadth that individuals can
tailor their conduct accordingly. A use meaning approach to the
Amendment’s boundaries must therefore focus to some degree on form and
use, rather than act and use.
The cost of that breadth, however, is inaccuracy. The more broadly a
First Amendment language game is defined, the less likely it is to capture
the values that justify its protection, and the more likely it is to be
overinclusive with regard to speech. But that is a cost that the First
Amendment encourages us to pay.279 Defining speech at the level of form
rather than that of individual speech acts may be imperfect, but it does help
check the government’s power to regulate speech by defining its
boundaries.
The malleability of the language game approach also suggests ways to
account for new social practices and language games—video games, for
example.280 Defining these as “speech” based on the ideas they convey
seems unsatisfying, to say the least. The answer seems to lie instead instead
with the fact that over time they have simply become recognized as such.
Admittedly, the power to make that determination is itself a form of speech
regulation.281 But such line-drawing is inevitably a part of First Amendment
doctrine. Better that the lines be drawn on the basis of such social practices
than on the basis of supposed relationships between words and concepts.
There are no straightforward and simple solutions to these problems.282

give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. . . . [W]here a vague statute ‘abut(s) upon
sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,’ it ‘operates to inhibit the exercise of
(those) freedoms.’”); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 370 (1983) (White, J.,
concurring) (“The Court has held that in such circumstances ‘more precision in drafting
may be required because of the vagueness doctrine in the case of regulation of expression;’
a ‘greater degree of specificity’ is demanded than in other contexts.” (internal citations
omitted)).
279
Schauer, Second Best, supra note 88, at 22 (“[T]he idea of free speech, as
contrasted with the justifications it is thought to serve, is itself an exercise in distrust, in
suboptimality, and in the recognition of the frequent virtues of second-best solutions.”).
280
Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (striking down, on First
Amendment grounds, restrictions on sales of violent video games to minors); see also
United States v. Stevens, 130 S.Ct. 1577 (2010) (striking down restrictions on depictions of
animal cruelty).
281
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First Amendment doctrine has proven slithy283 enough to cover the
Jabberwocky and other nonsensical speech, but perhaps the Justices will see
fit to gimble284 exceptions for other kinds of nonsense, leaving even nonartists mimsy.285 First Amendment doctrine and the language games on
which it is based are messy and ongoing projects—an experiment, “as all
life is an experiment.”286 The Amendment’s “linguistic turn” would yield no
more clear answers than the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy. But it
would, at the very least, better capture what we mean by meaning, and why
we think it matters for the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Since Ludwig Wittgenstein has served as a guide and occasional
stalking horse throughout this Article, it seems appropriate to conclude
where the Tractatus does. The seventh and final section famously reads, in
full: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”287 If the
boundaries of the First Amendment depend on the presence of conceptual
meaning, then Congress could codify Wittgenstein’s admonition without
violating the constitution, because saying what cannot be said is, by
definition, nonsense. This Article has argued that this cannot be the case,
and that the meaning of speech lies not in its connection to extra-linguistic
facts, but in its use. This road is more bumpy, but its imperfection offers
better footing than the smooth alternatives. “Back to the rough ground!”288
***
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